Both these statements are true:
1) your list of tests are not good tests because they don't exclude other explanations besides your favored one;
2) in order to have a list of good tests sufficient for a hypothesis, the lack of those observations must logically lead us to conclude only our favored hypothesis.
Take your pick :)
Some more Popper quotes for you, particularly regarding "mountains of evidence":
"For I am going to propose (in sections 20 f.) that the empirical method shall be characterized as a method that excludes precisely those ways of evading falsification which, as my imaginary critic rightly insists, are logically possible. According to my proposal, what charac- terizes the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival."
"A system such as classical mechanics may be ‘scientific’ to any degree you like; but those who uphold it dogmatically—believing, perhaps, that it is their business to defend such a successful system against criticism as long as it is not conclusively disproved—are adopting the very reverse of that critical attitude which in my view is the proper one for the scientist."
" This is very necessary; for a severe test of a system presup- poses that it is at the time sufficiently definite and final in form to make it impossible for new assumptions to be smuggled in. In other words, the system must be formulated sufficiently clearly and definitely to make every new assumption easily recognizable for what it is: a modification and therefore a revision of the system."
"A clear appreciation of what may be gained (and lost) by con- ventionalist methods was expressed, a hundred years before Poincaré, by Black who wrote: ‘A nice adaptation of conditions will make almost any hypothesis agree with the phenomena. This will please the imagination but does not advance our knowledge.’1"
"A theory is to be called ‘empirical’ or ‘falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty sub- classes. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it rules out, or prohibits): we call this the class of the potential falsifiers of the theory; and secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does not contradict (or which it ‘permits’). We can put this more briefly by saying: a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers is not empty."
"It might then be said, further, that if the class of potential falsifiers of one theory is ‘larger’ than that of another, there will be more opportunities for the first theory to be refuted by experience; thus compared with the second theory, the first theory may be said to be ‘falsifiable in a higher degree’. This also means that the first theory says more about the world of experience than the second theory, for it rules out a larger class of basic statements. Although the class of permitted statements will thereby become smaller, this does not affect our argu- ment; for we have seen that the theory does not assert anything about this class. Thus it can be said that the amount of empirical information conveyed by a theory, or its empirical content, increases with its degree of falsifiability."
"We say that a theory is ‘corroborated’ so long as it stands up to these tests. The appraisal which asserts corroboration (the corroborative appraisal) establishes certain fundamental relations, viz. compatibility and incompatibility. We regard incompatibility as falsification of the theory. But compatibility alone must not make us attribute to the the- ory a positive degree of corroboration: the mere fact that a theory has not yet been falsified can obviously not be regarded as sufficient. For nothing is easier than to construct any number of theoretical systems which are compatible with any given system of accepted basic state- ments. (This remark applies also to all ‘metaphysical’ systems.)"
So, let's see, going on twenty-six posts now, still waiting for answers to the questions:
What specific measure of climate sensitivity in degrees C/doubling of CO2 would you consider a falsification of AGW and CAGW?
What argument do you have to exclude a small increase in climate sensitivity in degrees C/doubling of CO2 from your initial falsification criteria?
The fact that your critiques of me continue to fail to include any sort of answer to the question is very telling, don't you think? :)
From what I surmise, you agree with AGW, but not CAGW. Correct?
I definitely see CAGW as silly - people can't even define "catastrophe" in any empirical way, so it's simply short hand for "you must do what I want or evil will happen!" It's the bread and butter of apocalyptic thinking that has plagued humanity since humanity.
As for AGW, I only agree with it in the most limited sense - that there is *some* non-zero effect. It's trivially true even with butterfly CO2 emissions.
I have seen no necessary and sufficient falsifiable hypothesis of any form of *observable* AGW. Attempts to attribute observed changes in temperature have been of the sort that use ad hoc special pleadings to deal with any length of non-correlation or pause - and, as I think Popper did a good job of explaining why the scientific method requires falsifiability (in the most strict sense), it has quite obviously failed and is only defensible by those who would treat it as a non-falsifiable hypothesis, either rejecting the evidence of their own observations, or following up with ad hoc special pleadings again and again.
You, for example, an obviously intelligent person, has managed to use their own rational motivation to fly close to a statement of falsifiability (low climate sensitivity), but have only skimmed the surface, and avoid the final step of picking a number and defending it. This is an *intelligent* thing for you to do in the defense of your beliefs - going even one small step further means that it all comes crashing down, despite the "mountains" of evidence you believe in.
Is it even possible to correct your own rationalization, however far astray it has led you? Probably not. You're just too smart for your own good, and will come up with every possible reason to avoid taking that last step.
It's like an atheist talking to a christian - I can get christians to talk about how they disbelieve in Zeus, or Thor, or Queztlcoatl, or Pele, or any number of thousands upon thousands of gods. They clearly get that Thor is just myth, legend, and obviously false. But they can't disbelieve in just *one more god*. It's just *one* step for them, but impossible for them to make.
And my bet, dear friend who spends so much time commenting with me, is that the final step, that *one* small step to asserting a cut off point for "low climate sensitivity", and arguing why we should place it there, is a step that you're emotionally unprepared to take :)