That's outdated, since we don't enforce that policy. As long as the feature is opt in, it is acceptable to introduce it in an update.
I've bought precisely ONE lottery ticket my whole life (knowing statistically that my likelihood of winning is the maximum at that point*).
How do you figure? Each ticket has the same chance of winning, the more you buy the more likely you are to win. But the odds are such that the expected return over the long run is less than what you would pay in.
I find it pretty funny that people who never gamble are completely clueless when it comes to statistics and probabilities, while those who waste loads of money gambling know exactly what they're doing.
As a poker player, I never release my trump card early in the game.
We miss you guys! Please come back!
Another? Don't mind if I do!
The problem is this: the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm, which Bitcoin transactions rely on for security, has three inputs: the transaction, the signerâ(TM)s private key and a random number. The algorithm then outputs two values, denoted r and s, where s is calculated with the formula k-1(z+rd), z being the hash of the message, k the random number and d the private key. r is dependent only on k. Thus, if the owner of an address signs two transactions with the same random number (and of course the same private key, as every address is linked to one private key), one can extract two s values from the two signatures, subtract them to make the rd terms cancel out, and extracting the private key from there becomes a simple division problem (a more detailed writeup can be found here). Normally, this is not a problem; given a true random number generator, the first âoecollisionâ should take place roughly at the same time as the heat death of the universe. As it turned out, however, java.security.SecureRandom proved to be not so random, generating the same âoerandomâ number twice on many occasions.
I just noticed the "found here" link goes to an article from January. That makes me both unsure they've got the right bug and annoyed it hasn't been fixed already.
The law on citizens' initiatives requires any that get over 50k signatures to go to a vote in the parliament. However, it can be delayed indefinitely if the relevant committee never decides to bring it to a vote by the full parliament. After the next election, any remaining initiatives are scrapped.
Obviously, this goes against the spirit of the law, so there's a good chance the situation will change.
Also, you can't just just compare "number of deaths." It matters who does the kiling and why. Lethal accidents are slightly acceptable. Lethal malice is not, because by accepting it, you create an incentive for there to be more of it.
Of course the numbers are relevant. A one in ten thousand chance a gun might fail to fire creates no incentive to attack the user. According to Wikipedia, "Between 1987 and 1990, McDowall found that guns were used in defense during a crime incident 64,615 times annually", "In 28% of incidents where a gun was used for self-defense, victims fired the gun at the offender.", so a gun fired in self defense would fail about once per eight months. I dare say few of these cases would be fatal. In contrast, one child dies in gun accident every three days. How is that acceptable?
>False positive = you die
Well with regular guns, you die too in this case with a far higher probability!
>False negative = you die
Only in the case that firing the gun will save you but threatening someone with a gun (which looks to be functional even if it isn't) won't. Possible but far from 100% of the case.
LIfe and death situations are rare. Given that a gun in the home is more likely to kill a family member accidentally than an intruder on purpose, a 90% effective smart gun would save more than nine lives for every one it wastes. The only reliability numbers I found with a quick search were for BIOMAC that claims a goal of 99.99%. This would save more than 10 000 lives for every one wasted.