A port no one is listening on is a damn wall. It does not do anything. It isn't a doorway. It's a blank featureless wall.
This too is wrong. To continue the metaphor, a port no one is listening on is a door with a deadbolt thrown on it. Anyone inside the house can open it up whenever they feel like it and start moving furniture in or out. A firewall can - at your option - leave it that way, add a fingerprint reader to the inside or brick up the doorway.
When your 500GB "disk" is directly addressable on the system bus and has the same latency as RAM, some of the design decisions in existing *nix look a bit questionable. Example: Does the additional work of implementing virtual memory (fundamental to most kernels) still make sense? How necessary is a file system *at all*? Could it be replaced with some other method of indexing data?
You certainly could just stick most of the storage in a ramdisk and run linux, but there might be massive performance gains to be had in the file (data?) serving and database spaces if the server software and the kernel it's running on are designed specifically for stable direct addressing of everything.
"Let me be clear – as in the physical space, cyber security CAN ONLY come at the expense of cyber privacy."
But as many others have noted, attempts are made to obscure or even reverse the perception of this tradeoff at every level. Heaven forbid anyone outside of our government should have to make an informed decision about this.
Meanwhile, the guys in timbucktooistan can now order the proven exploit kit from their favorite BBS.
Man, I hope you aren't anywhere near the legislative process. People like you are why we can't have nice things.
I have ten times more motivation and available time to research than my doctor does; he's just trying to last through his 80 patients a day and not kill anyone. His training and experience are certainly valuable, but for the most part when I'm talking to a doctor s/he's either (a) a generalist with a little bit of familiarity with me and a little bit of familiarity with what might be wrong with me, or (b) a specialist that knows a great deal about one particular thing that *might* be wrong with me but knows exactly dick about me personally.
I, on the other hand, have excellent computer skills and search fu, can read, understand and critique research in some disciplines (a skill that is highly transferable, by the way), and know a great deal about myself. I'd *much* rather be able to manage my own treatment and consult with a doctor when I need insight or specialized skills.
Breaking the law and a patent disregard constitutional rights is a "flaw"? It's not "evil" to make a secret court that makes secret laws that nobody is allowed to see?
I think I'm as concerned about the NSA's overreach as the next guy, but it should be noted here that it wasn't the NSA that established those secret courts and National Security Letters; it was our Congress.
Their focus is mostly financial, but I really enjoy their world news reporting. Whenever I pick up a "normal" paper here, even (especially?) one of the "big" ones, it seems that they're trying to sell me an extreme viewpoint - and maybe some male enhancement products to go with it - rather than actually impart any information. The FT is much more reporting like I remember it used to be. Maybe because they actually charge enough for their paper to cover their costs.
I find it somewhat reassuring that I can still encounter a government employee who doesn't know my shoe size before I walk in the door. Even if that is really just an illusion these days, it's one I treasure.
...code bumming kludge...
Speaking as someone who's developed C++ template libraries for a bunch of different projects, I've gotta say that that's the best description I've yet heard.
Flying in the U.S. is a godawful degrading experience these days. I remember when it used to be exciting. Frickin' sucks.
In my hypothetical offline-validator scenario, it doesn't have to scale because it's not running at transaction time. Go ahead and reset the password, generate a bunch of new fake hashes and store the index of the "real" one in the same log that will be picked up for validation later on. With asymmetric encryption, the log could be stolen outright and be of no use at all to an attacker.
That said, I'd probably lean towards an online validator just so I could stick attackers in a honeypot and keep them from messing with my users. Though, as someone else pointed out here, by far the most likely use for the stolen passwords is not on my site, but to use them to log into bank accounts.
The second DB doesn't have any of the the password hashes, it just knows which one is correct. It's a single table of (userid, hashid) where hashid is just some small integer.
The idea seems to be that the second system can be a smaller, less complicated single-function server, easier to harden and could be running a different OS/Webserver/DB stack. You could (by sacrificing real-time validation) even have the second system entirely firewalled off and unreachable to an attacker, just polling the login servers to validate the sessions at some small interval.
If the second system goes down, one approach would be to just accept any of the passwords until it comes back up. Then check the logs of what happened while it was offline and act accordingly (invalidate sessions, raise alarms, whatever).
Overall, I like the idea tremendously. It seems like it's not quite all there yet, but we're probably going to start implementing some variant of it immediately.