They'll probably call it CyberUL.
They'll probably call it CyberUL.
Neither visible light nor RF at the cm-wavelength scale are ionizing, and so cannot cause DNA damage.
Ultraviolet light causes skin cancer because it is both ionizing and has a short penetration depth.
Bullshit. Exposure to RF is inducing cancer because it randomly changes DNA. The dose does not matter in this effect.
Bullshit. Wavelength is not a dose.
Long-wavelength RF, below the ionization threshold, does not cause cancer because it lacks the energy necessary to "randomly change DNA". You're right, the dose doesn't matter -- sub-ionization RF doesn't cause cancer.
I order quite a bit from Amazon, including things that split shipments (ship different days or are a mix of Prime and non-Prime). The "Your order [...] has shipped!" e-mails list an amount charged for the items that actually shipped, and these are the same values that appear on my credit card. While the default "Your Orders" view on the website groups things by order (which is not the same as shipment or credit card charge), the "Invoice" link on each order breaks down the order correctly (by shipment, with separated charges). These also match up with credit card charges.
That why I always work with "N" in my studies - it's much bigger than "n".
I know the Slashdot trope is that n is always too small in any study, regardless of the actual size of n.
The sample size you need to demonstrate statistical significance (or, conversely, the level of statistical significance achieved for a given sample size) depends on the behavior you're measuring. If you're measuring a small change in a rare occurrence, you need a very large sample population. If, on the other hand, your hypothesis is "black sheep exist" or "this vaccine reduces the mortality rate of a disease that has an untreated survival rate of 1 in 100,000", then a single occurrence (black sheep, surviving subject) is significant at n=1, and two occurrences out of even a tiny n is excellent.
No. "Specific" and "catch-all" are pretty different.
Dark energy, for example, is essentially the discrepancy between the observed expansion rate of the universe and the quantity of detectable matter in the universe.
astronomy it is dark matter or something similar
Dark matter is not some astrophysics catch-all explanation. Dark matter and dark energy separately refer to a specific observed discrepancy for which we don't have an answer yet.
Shade, local terrain, building codes, subsidies, power company buyback policies and rates. There are also a lot of odd business arrangements that are localized that can dramatically reduce the solar capital cost.
I have no idea if they account for any of these factors, but there are certainly a lot more factors than weather-adjusted annual insolation.
The US has officially been proven to be an oligarchy as described here
You know you're on the Internet when a single study counts as "official proof".
Now you just need someone to reply asking for confirmation, then a person to reply that it is confirmed, since they saw that the same study does in fact exist. (Needless to say, no involved parties have read the study.)
Yes. That is made clear. Almost all of the article is about the NSA's capabilities. Then, at the end, some text, including the quoted part, about how this is important even if you don't mind the actions of the NSA.
"Even if you're not inclined to view the NSA as an adversary
No they don't. The likelihood of collisions depends only on the effective number of bits in the hash. If you have a 32 bit hash, and more than 2^32 images, you are guaranteed to have collisions.
Yes, they do, because the shortest available cryptographic hash has a 128-bit output.
I didn't say there weren't.
IWF, the organization named in the summary who is providing "hash lists" to Google, Facebook, and Twitter.
Its not a hash in the sense of MD5/SHA etc that hashes the file contents at the byte level.
It's MD5, SHA1, and PhotoDNA hashes.
The standard in most law enforcement forensic applications is MD5 / SHA1, despite the obvious limitations.
Sadly, it still is reasonably common to encounter byte-identical images that are on the relatively small "known-bad image" hash lists.
As long as we're going to reinvent the wheel again, we might as well try making it round this time. - Mike Dennison