Do you understand the point and how
a) open-source, and
b) Public Key Encryption
Do you understand the point and how
a) open-source, and
b) Public Key Encryption
Concur 100%. One really strong, long, and easy to use passphrase to unlock all the other passwords.
Ctrl-B (copy username to system clipboard)
Ctrl-V (paste username)
Ctrl-C (copy password to system clipboard)
Ctrl-V (paste password)
Fast, Simple, Easy. Can even copy the encrypted password database onto a thumb drive so if it is ever lost / stolen -- good luck "cracking" the master password.
You owe me a new keyboard.
What needs to be done, as a minimum, is something like Password Hasher (the firefox plugin) needs to be built into each browser.
That protects against what is probably the least interesting situation—when the user's password to one site is silently compromised by attacking that site, and the user used that same password on another site. First, it assumes that the user's password is weak enough to be readily cracked by someone hammering on the password database (which if it is salted properly, is unlikely). Second, it ignores the reality that most passwords are not compromised by server-side security holes; they're compromised by client-side security holes—keyloggers, etc.
To use a car analogy, this is like putting an un-pickable lock on a car to protect your expensive radio, but leaving the factory glass windows untouched.
I think that Google Authenticator tries to prevent mitm attacks by having any given token usable exactly once in addition to having a very short lifespan.
Here's why that doesn't work. The attack is very, very, very simple, and once you see it explained, you'll never trust those sorts of services again. A basic attack looks like this:
Elapsed time: tens of milliseconds after the user logs in. A slightly more sophisticated attack looks like this:
Elapsed time: tens of milliseconds after the user logs in. And if the service you're logging into works the way most services do, an even simpler attack looks like this:
Elapsed time: zero milliseconds after the user logs in. But the best one of all is this:
Elapsed time: zero milliseconds after the device is first compromised or GA is first installed.
All four techniques are 100% transparent and are 100% effective attacks against software-generated time-based authentication schemes. The first two are 100% effective against hardware tokens used for time-based authentication, too. In fact, even if Google upped the ante and made the authenticator be interactive, where the Google servers sent a unique nonce that had to be encoded along with the time stamp, this scheme would still not be significantly stronger. The only change required to the first two schemes would be adding one additional step—telling the attacker's server to issue a request to Google and pass that request nonce to the compromised client. And the third and fourth schemes would continue working as-is. This is why time-based authentication is basically worthless unless the endpoint is trusted (and at this point, I'm growing more and more convinced that users should assume that their endpoints are not trusted).
The reality of the matter is that time-based authentication schemes are an anachronism. When they were first conceived by RSA in the mid-1980s, they were not intended for general users. They were intended to protect against precisely one threat—an attacker with a very specific target watching a user type in his or her password from a distance. They work well for that purpose. They can be compromised once by any attacker who gains control over the system where the authentication token is being entered, even if hardware tokens are involved, and they are permanently compromised by any attacker who gains control over the system where the secret key is stored. The reason there haven't been very many new implementations of time-based authentication since the 1990s is that such schemes just aren't particularly useful against modern attacks. They give the illusion of security without actually adding any. Well, unless you're worried about your roommate seeing you enter your password.
Put another way, creating a secure authentication scheme where the endpoint is compromised is fundamentally impossible for precisely the same reason that perfect DRM is fundamentally impossible. Alice is also Eve and Mallory. Food for thought.
Sigh. Ignore the first sentence in the second paragraph. This is what over-editing does.
Yes, lots of weak passwords are guessed by automated bots. This tends to affect websites like Facebook, message boards, etc., where the maximum possible damage is fairly limited and mostly harmless. By contrast, most people's bank account passwords are not "12345".
Not for important accounts, though. For things like banks, the password rules generally are already strong enough to make guessing problematic unless you know your victim, and to some degree, even then. It is far easier to make a virus that compromises millions of machines and looks at what letters the users just typed, or injects spyware into their browsers to detect which of those virtual PIN number pad buttons the user clicked, or whatever. Instead of an attack on a specific person that requires research, you can successfully compromise thousands or even millions of people. Why spend a high amount of effort per target when you can spend almost none and get similar results?
This, of course, ignores attacks on the infrastructure itself (e.g. attacking a credit card processor to steal credit/debit card numbers en masse or installing a card skimmer on an ATM). Those sorts of attacks also seem to be pretty popular, but they don't have much to do with passwords.
The FIDO stuff sounds like a whole lot of expensive extra technology with no real benefit over a password. A finger swipe is a replayable event just as much as a password or PIN.
The Google Authenticator is conceptually okay in theory, but in practice, AFAIK, it too becomes a gaping security hole as soon as your mobile device gets compromised.
If you want something stronger than passwords, it must have the following criteria:
None of these schemes I've seen so far address #3, and as a result, none of them are significantly more secure than typing letters at random and pasting the resulting password into a text file on your Desktop. They try to address problems that don't actually exist, while failing to address the root of the problem, which is that computers, mobile devices, etc. are not inherently secure.
For example, Google Authenticator uses a time-based token. This tries to avoid replay attacks by limiting the period during which an attack is possible. That doesn't work very well, though, unless you can delay an attacker's ability to sniff that token. This means that you have to prevent a MITM attack. As soon as the device is compromised, SSL and TLS are no longer capable of preventing a MITM attack, so the entire scheme falls apart.
Anything short of a non-networked device communicating with your computer over a very simple protocol (think "formal verification" here) is not a major win, IMO. And it can't be something silly like touching a smart card to an RFID reader, either, because the reader could perform more than one transaction, and you would have no way of knowing that you just bought some farmer in Iowa a new tractor alongside that DVD from Amazon. No, you really need a physical screen and a button on the device saying, "Do you agree to transfer $258,000 to Bank of Nigeria?" in order to significantly improve things. Anything short of that is just wasting a lot of time and expense without addressing the real problem—that if you can't trust the endpoint, you can't trust the message. Start by developing a truly trusted endpoint. After that, the entire problem becomes fairly trivial.
I, for one, am 100% gung-ho about having a 3rd-party in the 'cloud' handling every single one of my packets so that they can balance them between my connections!
There are already lots of third parties handling each of your packets. I'm not sure why one extra router would be a cause for concern.
Man, I guess you just don't like Star Trek.
Spock's Brain had its laughable qualities, but it was also a perfectly acceptable cautionary sci-fi story about a society that had stagnated under the control of a machine intelligence. If they had resolved the story some other way than by piloting Spock around like a robot, it would have been pretty good.
Operation: Annihilate! is one of my all-time favorites! Those creepy jelly creatures are creepy. The shots of the seemingly abandoned city are spooky. They killed Kirk's brother in that episode -- BOOM, dead. And the idea that an alien, thoroughly inhuman lifeform can inject cells into your body that grow up your spinal cord and control you, AND that although the aliens look like brainless jellyfish, they are actually a malevolent force that wants to use humans piloting starships to carry them across the galaxy, is a compelling science fiction concept.
Catspaw is another favorite of mine, but why argue the point? It's ludicrous.
The Enterprise Incident was kinda just a Mission Impossible episode set in space
As for the Omega Glory, while the whole "alternate, identical Earth" idea was way overused in TOS scripts, it's actually a pretty decent take on the whole Cold War scenario, flipped on its head so that the Federation guy was actually a crazy bastard in league with the Commie Chinese and the guys he was killing off were actually the good guys -- only the good guys had become so debased and ignorant that you couldn't recognize them. The Chinese were the ones that seemed intelligent and sophisticated. And remember, this aired during the Vietnam War, six months after the Tet Offensive.
Bread and Circuses? That was about a world where the Roman Empire survived into the 20th Century technology, with 20th Century technology. They watched gladiator fights ON TELEVISION -- don't you see how that might have resonated with TV audiences in the 1960s? Marshal "The Medium is the Message" McLuhan was publishing his books on media theory around this time. Again, totally valid sci-fi speculation
Honestly, I'll argue that ANY episode of TOS has its charms and intelligence
But anyway, with a list of "hated its" that long, I repeat: I guess you just don't like Star Trek.
> but stop pretending like the old Star Trek was some sort of masterpiece. It wasn't.
Bullshit. ST:TNG had some dam fine episodes:
Frame of Mind
Ship in a Bottle
The Measure of a Man
The Mind's Eye
Thine Own Self
Watch TOS again. Most of the episodes were truly terrible.
I totally disagree. It declined in quality over the three seasons, and there are a few real howlers, but "terrible"? I don't think so. That's the kind of criticism people are always leveling at the old Doctor Who, with the cardboard sets and rubber monsters, but that was a clever, endearing show, too. I think it's Star Wars that ruined it for everybody
If you learn one useless thing every day, in a single year you'll learn 365 useless things.