Have you seen a single classified email yet that went through that server while it was still classified information? If so, you haven't bothered to show it to us.
I'm not sure you understand how these things work. Or you do, and you're trolling.
Anybody who ever served on active duty and handled classified information is just a bit hacked off at Her Majesty's cavalier attitude about, well, everything.
That's true, but comparing Hillary's sending and receiving emails that weren't marked as classified over a non-government server is absolutely NOTHING compared to Petraus' knowingly giving top secret information to someone with neither a need to know nor a security clearance. Remember Mata Hari? (I probably spelled that wrong)
Plus, his adultery is strictly against the USMJ code; people have gotten dishonorable discharges for that alone, and anyone else would have gotten time in Leavenworth for spilling secrets. Petraus got off not with a slap on the wrist, but a stern talking to.
I use the Gnu Image Manipulation Program (GIMP) to design book covers. It's an excellent free open source program that has three weaknesses -- its menu structure is completely illogical (but can be gotten used to), I can't find a full spectrum palette, and its text handling is so poor as to be useless.
The primary test for all kinds of organized crime is that there has to be an agreement between the involved parties, an understanding to commit a crime together. That is usually the difficult part to prove.
A torrent is more like a mob. You can leave or join at any time and nobody else cares much. There's very little organisation. I don't think you could successfully bring an organized crime charge against a mob.
When the masses decided on what the Internet looks like, out went newsgroups, mailing lists, Web forums, and IRC. In return, we have Facebook, and Twitter.
Which have begun to add in newgroups, mailing lists, forums and chats...
What we need more is a base model of distrust.
The primary design error in networking was to trust other devices. If we had designed networking from the start under the assumption of malicious intruders, we would have things like "to do anything, you need a token that proves you're allowed to do it". It would be in the protocols.
On embedded devices, I want a networking stack that will cryptographically check all incoming packets, and at the lowest level discard them if they don't carry a valid token. Nothing gets even processed unless you are authorized to interact with the device.
Don't quit your day job.
"Ignorance is the soil in which belief in miracles grows." -- Robert G. Ingersoll