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Comment: much more permissive warrant regime as well (Score 4, Informative) 86

by indaba (#40626169) Attached to: 2 Year Data Retention For Australian ISPs
Material stored for 2 years is the least of it. ASIO wants a much more permissive (weaker ?) warrant regime ...

"Modernise and streamline ASIOâ(TM)s warrant provisions" means fixing these perceived problems:

  • * if there are multiple computers on a premises, and it is only discovered upon entering the premises for the purpose of executing a warrant that a particular computer is not connected to the computer system specified in the warrant, it would be necessary to seek another warrant
  • * A new warrant is required in every instance where there is a significant change in circumstances.
  • * warrants under the ASIO Act currently last for a maximum of six months, except for a search warrant which must be executed within 90 days
  • * the current provisions in the ASIO Act do not enable a warrant to be extended.
  • * In approximately one third of cases more than one ASIO Act warrant type is sought against a particular target. Under the current provisions, this requires the preparation of multiple applications, each reâcasting the available intelligence case to emphasise the relevant facts and grounds to satisfy the different legislative requirements of the various warrant types
  • * Subsection 25A(5) currently restricts ASIO from doing anything under a computer access warrant that adds, deletes or alters data or interferes with, interrupts, or obstructs the lawful use of the target computer by other persons
  • * it is not always feasible to execute a search warrant on a person of interest while they are âat or nearâ(TM) the premises specified in the warrant.
  • * The requirement to maintain a list of the individual names of each officer who may be involved in executing a warrant can create operational inefficiencies for ASIO.

naturally, there are solutions proposed for all these issues !

Comment: huge wishlist of new surveillance powers here (Score 4, Informative) 86

by indaba (#40626021) Attached to: 2 Year Data Retention For Australian ISPs
From crikey.com.au
"The final terms of reference for the inquiry match the proposals sent to the committee by Roxon, and include the controversial 2 year data retention proposal long urged by Attorney-Generalâ(TM)s bureaucrats. However, the committee has now also published a discussion paper prepared by the Attorney-Generalâ(TM)s Department to commence the inquiry, outlining the rationale for three types of proposals: those the government wants to progress, those it is considering, and those it is merely seeking views on."
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcis/nsl2012/additional/discussion%20paper.pdf
Encryption

Full Disk Encryption Hard For Law Enforcement To Crack 575

Posted by timothy
from the you-say-problem-I-say-potato dept.
If you'd rather keep your data private, take heart: disk encryption is a lot harder to break than techno-thriller movies and TV shows make it out to be, to the chagrin of some branches of law enforcement. MrSeb writes with word of a paper titled "The growing impact of full disk encryption on digital forensics" [abstract here to paywalled article] that illustrates just how difficult it is. According to the paper, co-authored by a member of US-CERT, "[T]here are three main problems with full disk encryption (FDE): First, evidence-gathering goons can turn off the computer (for transportation) without realizing it's encrypted, and thus can't get back at the data (unless the arrestee gives up his password, which he doesn't have to do); second, if the analysis team doesn't know that the disk is encrypted, it can waste hours trying to read something that's ultimately unreadable; and finally, in the case of hardware-level disk encryption, tampering with the device can trigger self-destruction of the data. The paper does go on to suggest some ways to ameliorate these issues, but ultimately the researchers aren't hopeful: 'Research is needed to develop new techniques and technology for breaking or bypassing full disk encryption.'"

Comment: Relevant case law on s308H (Score 2) 231

by indaba (#37722340) Attached to: Security Researcher Threatened With Vulnerability Repair Bill
From SALTER v DPP [2008] NSWSC 1325 (5 December 2008)
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2008/1325.html

13 Counsel appearing for the defendant drew attention to a number of prior decisions, albeit on different statutory provisions, those cases including Gilmour v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1995) 43 NSWLR 243, The Director of Public Prosecutions v Murdoch [1993] 1 VR 406 at 409,410. In that last mentioned case Hayne J said:-

“... Where, as is the case here, the question is whether the entry was with permission, it will be important to identify the entry and to determine whether that entry was within the scope of the permission that had been given. If the permission was not subject to some express or implied limitation which excluded the entry from its scope, then the entry will be with lawful justification but if the permission was subject to an actual express or implied limitation which excluded the actual entry made, then the entry will be “without lawful authority to do so.” ...

In my view the section requires attention to whether the particular entry in question was an entry that was made without lawful authority. In the case of a hacker it will be clear that he has no authority to enter the system. In the case of an employee the question will be whether that employee had authority to affect the entry with which he stands charged. If he has a general and unlimited permission to enter the system then no offence is proved. If however there are limits upon the permission given to him to enter that system it will be necessary to ask was the entry within the scope of that permission? If it was, then no offence was committed; if it was not, then he has entered the system without lawful authority to do so.”

14 The passage has direct application to the situation here.

15 Authorisation to use a computer or authorisation in an entirely different field of law may be general or it may be limited or it may be subject to conditions, and I do not believe that s 308B should be given an operation so as to set at nought that aspect of the general law. As Hayne J said in the passage to which I have referred:-

“If there are limits upon the permission given, it will be necessary to ask was the entry within the scope of that permission?"

------- So, much will depend on the terms that governed the access to the website. Can these be posted ?
Space

Iran Plans To Put a Monkey Into Space 153

Posted by timothy
from the why-can't-they-put-them-all? dept.
arisvega writes "Iran plans to send a live monkey into space in the summer, the country's top space official said after the launch of the Rassad-1 satellite, state television reported on its website on Thursday. 'The Kavoshgar-5 rocket will be launched during the month of Mordad (July 23 to August 23) with a 285-kilogramme capsule carrying a monkey to an altitude of 120 kilometres (74 miles),' said Hamid Fazeli, head of Iran's Space Organisation. No mentioning on retrieving the monkey, though."

Comment: Re:David Cameron actually believes his own rhetori (Score 1) 629

by alext (#34118326) Attached to: UK Pressures the US To Takedown Extremist Videos

Before WWII? I think you've been reading the same history book as Dave Cameron (the one where the UK and USA are fighting together in 1940).
There's no question that the UK was a major power 60 years ago.
A better case could be made for ~1955, but even in 1966 Britain was able to argue that its global reach amounted to shouldering enough of an anti-communist burden to justify staying out of Vietnam.
The Falklands War is quite interesting here, not because it demonstrated some lingering imperial might, in fact the opposite - the UK depended heavily on the USA. Where it gets special is that this help was given (initially) without approval from the White House, solely by virtue of long-established intelligence and military links.

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