If this is how things stand, then the Philosophy of Mathematics to date is a catastrophic failure. When there is no better methodology than "fumble around in the dark a bit until suddenly you're convinced" then the project of attempting to guide students in understanding maths has done no work at all.
Is this the fault of the philosophers or the mathematicians? I'm inclined to think that the philosophers have at least failed in their advocacy, if not in their actual subject.
People are capable of perfection.
We call the demand that everything be perfect an anxiety disorder. If your claim is that sporting should have been perfected by now in a sense that Esports aren't, then I begin to wonder whether the dispute here is simply concerning a phenomenological difference in performance anxiety. That would make sense, since this isn't sport.
Scientific models tend to express a common computational relationship. That's because we like to quantify things in scientific models, and perhaps unsurprisingly, we have a fairly standard paradigm for quantitative analysis in our mathematical algebraic, geometric and topological models.
The physicists here are discussing a feature of using information theory to generalize how certain fixed parameters can take values at different scales while still preserving most of their predictive structure. That's all.
Science journalists need to stop sensationalizing mathematically interesting results. This is a neat account of scale and pattern matching in applied mathematics, but it's not a "unified theory of all scientific theorising" any more than, say, Bayesian Inference is.
However robots can't do engineering. Robots can't think. AI is a pipe dream for at least the next century. We don't really understand how our own minds work. Computers are binary. Humans brains are at least trinary. Until a computer can do maybe then true ai is impossible.
Both Philosophically and Neuropsychologically, the idea that the mind is foundationally more complicated than some kind of Turing machine network is very much in dispute. We're getting loads done by treating the human mind mechanically and exploring its heuristics and biases or its structures and protocols in a mathematically classical background framework. The human brain is a massively complex device, and has techniques for understanding that there are some vaguenesses and gaps in the way we semantically process the world, but to suggest that this is something beyond the reach of any classically constructed system is a powerful thesis that, we might think, there is a certain amount of optimistic inductive reason to doubt.
I disagree with the claim that "if someone is acting extremely morally wrong, it is okay to hate them". You do not need to hate people in order to come into conflict with them on matters of moral judgement, and since that would be the only case in which actively hating people seems justified, I don't think it stands up.
The kind of tolerance being talked about here is one of tolerating the fact that people exist and have personal autonomy, and hatred seems to clash with that toleration. On the other hand, "not hating someone" doesn't mean "letting their injustices go unchallenged".
Basically, this whole diversion should demonstrate two things to you.
First, that you shouldn't play the game of semantic uncharitability without being absolutely semantically beyond criticism. If you insist on being a pedant, fine, but be authentic in your pedantry, rather than just using it as a tool to poke cheap jabs at other people in a debate.
Secondly, that even in accepting the idea that there is a matter of fact about semantic interpretation, you are committing yourself to certain oughts and shoulds. At this point you might trot out Hume's "is-ought distinction", and in response I will point to the idea of semantic protocol (in, say, Gricean semantics) as constituted by conventions and psychological properties of human beings.
If you're going to go play the ethical nihilist, do not try to correct peoples' use of language.
I did not say that was the only way you could change my mind.
In saying "Otherwise" in that context, you said exactly that. If you didn't mean that, then you shouldn't have said that.
Where did I say that?
When you said:
... people shouldn't do that?
Saying that "should" is simply subjective is saying that people can do whatever they want.
Where did I even say that, because you're not a God, you can't convince me?
When you said:
Are you an omnipotent being who decides what is absolutely right and what is absolutely wrong? Otherwise
Saying that the exceptional case is one where I'm "an omnipotent being who decides blah di blah" and otherwise "simply subjective" means that the only way I can possibly change your mind is if I'm God. QED. Sorry.
Yes, I am being a jerk. Sometimes, nice is not right, and right is not nice.
That's not what I said, but if believing that's what I said makes you feel better, then fine.
It wasn't about making me feel better. It was a correct interpretation of what you said. You stated, specifically, that in any case other than that in which I am a God that decides absolute correctness, you conclude that ethical judgement is simply subjective - by which, on the standard reading of subjectivity in ethics, you take it that it is decided by individual people for themselves. By which, you must, logically, include yourself.
As regards "absolute" morals, I'm not really fussed. Factive ethics is more than good enough for my point to get off the ground, and as mentioned above, that position is well supported by the statistical research of some excellent investigators.