And nobody seems to bring up the point that the plant was scheduled to be decommissioned in 2011.
So where is your evidence for this claim?
One particular gem is the claim that in 2006, all the relevant parties "knew" that tsunamis could be much worse than was originally forecast. Even if we grant that dubious claim (since I see no evidence that TEPCO institutionally knew of this prior to 2008 or 2009, when they had conducted their own studies), we still have the problem of determining what measures to take in response.
A logical explanation is the commission tasked to investigate this has better access to information and resources than you do.
In hindsight, it's obvious that backup generators were a weak point for such flooding. It's not so obvious in foresight.
Yes it is, have you heard the term "putting your eggs in one basket"?
Large organizations don't turn on a dime. Nuclear regulation in particular is a control system with several years lag.
Just quoting the report "They either intentionally postponed putting safety measures in place, or made decisions based on their organization’s self interest, and not in the interest of public safety" and ""From TEPCO’s perspective, new regulations would have interfered with plant operations and weakened their stance in potential lawsuits. That was enough motivation for TEPCO to aggressively oppose new safety regulations and draw out negotiations with regulators via the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC)."
Had they not resisted the implementation of regulation, via collusion, then the planning and mitigation efforts may have been less. Certainly collusion on the Government and Regulators behalf is a factor, however their role in this manmade accident was not as obvious as TEPCO's at the time. I agree that they share some blame.Just how much blame is probably best revealed in a court however, this won't be seen as a positive for TEPCO in a finding of criminal negligence.
without explaining where this preparedness for a first time ever accident in Japanese history
From the report The direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to March 11, 2011. But the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami that hit on that day. The operator (TEPCO), the regulatory bodies (NISA and NSC) and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry (METI), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements—such as assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation release"
So, the answer is planning, drills, dry runs, simulations. Any venture you carry out must be planned with contingencies if something goes wrong. Earthquakes and tsunamis are designed into the Japanese building code, so they are also known to occur and are hardly first time incidents.
As the report reveals though, TEPCO were actively resisting any regulation put in place that would result in it having to do anything. Particularly the report show us just how woefully unprepared they were.
"sections in the diagrams of the severe accident instruction manual were missing. Workers not only had to work using this flawed manual, but they were pressed for time, and working in the dark with flashlights as their only light source".
Light and proper documentation are rudimentary issues to be unprepared for.
Lumping all three together is deceitful.
I don't understand your point. The government and the regulator also share some responsibility. Ascertaining the depth of blame is a matter for the courts as the collusion will be an ongoing matter however I don't see any political capital to be gained by the commission lying. Assigning blame was not their goal, seems to me they did their job, what are you saying?
We know that they made mistakes, had poor design, gamed the regulatory system a little, and moved slow on recent historical earthquake research. That doesn't make them incompetent as a result.
Those actions led to this disaster, a lack of preparedness. You are effectively agreeing they were criminally negligent. I believe they were capable of preparing for such an emergency properly, their motivations weren't focused on safety.
I am puzzled why we should expect a near flawless response from the plant operator, regulators, and government in the absence of experience of such things.
If it was a near flawless response then the accident would not have happened in the first place. The response would have come through planning based on an understanding of the way the reactor behaved, not reacting to the accident in the first place.