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Comment: Re:The Solution (Score 1) 378

by Mr Bubble (#39955625) Attached to: Overheated Voting Machine Cast Its Own Votes

That would be the weakest link in the chain - having a bar code. I suppose that, given the current level of OCR and a nice, clean, font that's known ahead of the time by the machine doing the scanning, there really is no reason to have a bar code unless the OCR slows down recounts or processing significantly. Still, unlike the current system, there would be a clear and easy way to do verification and mandated spot checks would be more than enough to root out statistical anomalies in the machine.

Comment: Re:The Solution (Score 1) 378

by Mr Bubble (#39950639) Attached to: Overheated Voting Machine Cast Its Own Votes

I think there are certain time-tested givens that are needed for fair elections. There is no reason to bring any receipt out of the voting area. Any generated chit should go into a locked box. This doesn't insure your vote is counted correctly, but my idea of a punched ballot that is both human and machine readable does ensure that your vote is as you intended when you place it in the box. The rest is common sense verification systems. At least with a paper trail, verification is possible. Otherwise it is a black box.

Comment: The Solution (Score 2) 378

by Mr Bubble (#39949955) Attached to: Overheated Voting Machine Cast Its Own Votes
First, I have to say that it is stunning that we can have ATM's that are largely error-free, but can't design a simple tabulation and reporting system. But, here is the solution. You don't rely on computer-collected data. You cross-check. Here's how: My proposal uses the computer terminal only as a means to record the vote on paper. There are definitely benefits to having an electronic front end on the voting process - maybe we can all agree on that - assuming that the front end is extremely simple and obvious to all users. In my world, you get your official ballot from the check-in people and insert it into the machine. You cast your vote and the machine prints both a machine readable code and the human-readable results of your voting on the one ballot. You remove your ballot and the machine dumps its memory. You place your ballot in the locked ballot box - just as we always have. The ballots are ran through some very basic ( and open source ) optical scanner and the results posted.

What this solves:

  • Has the benefit of an electronic screen with big, bright, reprogrammable choices in the required languages etc.
  • The voter verifies that their ballot is correct before they put it in the box.
  • A certain percentage of the ballots chosen randomly can and should be regularly hand-counted to insure accurate optical scanning. This and larger hand counts are easy because the ballots are easily read by humans and machine alike.
  • Very difficult to hack the system as optical scanners are open source and easily cross-checked for accuracy by people on the scene and by random or court-ordered recounts.
  • No danger of any centralized computer failure
  • A verifiable record of results
  • No hanging chads

Why can we not do this? Is it because people in power want a way to cheat? This isn't rocket science.

Comment: Re:Big Brother? (Score 1) 628

Fight what the police and corporations can do with it. That's the problem.

This assumes transparency and honesty on the part of these entities. I think many in law enforcement are honest and decent and many are not. I also note that law enforcement is hostile to transparency - witness the uproar about citizens videotaping police.

I'll turn over a new leaf. -- Miguel de Cervantes

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