What the French republic implementation does (not the bogus system described in this article, that pertains to a particular party internal votes only) seems to enable verifiable anonymous votes.
You receive credentials in a split fashion. Half comes in the mailbox as paper. The second half is sent to a personal device (email is possible, but sms is preferred). If you want to prevent somebody to vote for you, just have your credentials sent to your personal phone, even if the family head receives the mail credentials, he cannot use them.
Second, the voting receipt is a sha key. Should there be a need for recounting, or should a citizen verify his vote, the sha key can be used. However, just having the sha key doesn't tell anybody what the vote was (without authority compliance, which is improbable to say the least, the procedure involves showing up IN PERSON with the sha printout, to verify your own vote). Votes are stored on the server anonymized, the sha key codes the voter identity, actually.
It is not immune to tempering (physical access to the computers always eliminate any expectation of security, just like physical access to paper ballots would result in the same uncertainty), but it is not -that- weak, and can be recounted if needed (by asking citizens to give back their sha keys, one can verify if all ballots have been counted, since the sha key is a proof of having voted, if the corresponding ballot is not found, there is a proof of tempering the results).