CALEA only requires the backdoor to exist if it's technically possible. TFA is pretty clear that other manufacturers and carriers have chosen to implement end-to-end encryption that doesn't have the ability to be backdoored, and as such, there's no need to provide the (non-existent) backdoor to the feds.
Can you design a system you would solely supply for encrypted end-to-end communications that could NOT have a backdoor implemented? If you implement the end-points, then a back-door is automatically possible - you control the encryption/decryption on the ends.
See the CALEA Act passed in 1994. Telecom providers HAVE to provide that backdoor. If not - they are subject to fines of up to $10,000 per day per connection not in compliance, and having their network shut down until it comes into compliance.
Your indignation should not be directed at Verizon - it should be directed at Washington, DC.
I can tell you that in my field, Chinese is used at least 4x more often than Spanish.
I don't have stereo vision, you insensitive clod!
You're not supposed to be watching your stereo...
My firearms have NEVER killed another person. Nor will they EVER kill another person. In fact, I don't know ANY firearm that has ever killed another person.
However, there are PLENTY of people who seek to kill others, either through negligence or malice. The choice of tool is irrelevant; the user of the tool is what matters.