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+ - EMSEC: One Vulnerability to Pown Them All

Submitted by Kishin
Kishin (2859885) writes "One concern the NSA's TAO catalog should bring security community is the attacks using electromagnetic waves. The field concerning these is called EMission SECurity (EMSEC). NSA invested much into their defenses, code-named TEMPEST. TEMPEST products/services are a big industry. Too bad it's mostly classified and unavailable to general public. The good news is that TEMPEST is really just electromagnetic shielding. There's plenty of information on that due to its use in commercial applications. More in link below:

https://www.schneier.com/blog/...

Nick P
Security Engineer"

Comment: Re:catalog of them (Score 1) 94

by Kishin (#46132119) Attached to: In an Age of Cyber War, Where Are the Cyber Weapons?

China and Russia are certainly involved in cyber espionage, especially for state secrets or intellectual property. I was simply pointing out that the US is the main country talking about how we have to be worried about cyberwar and is also the main country using a vast arsenal of cyberweapons against most developed nations, including allies & neutrals.

This is both a nice irony and a potential explanation for why we know neither specifics of cyber weapons nor how to stop good ones.

+ - Bruce Schneier says Trust the Math. DON'T!

Submitted by Kishin
Kishin (2859885) writes "NSA subverted many crypto libraries, protocols and products. People are freaking out. Many users want to know what crypto they can trust and what they can't. Most subversion activities have happened with code, protocols, configurations and endpoint issues rather than the math itself. This is probably why Bruce says "Trust the Math." Many people that take that literally are doomed to make about as many mistakes as people who read Applied Cryptography and started hombrewing algorithms. The math has many risk areas and must be vetted as thoroughly as anything else. My essay gives specifics in the link below:

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/friday_squid_bl_396.html#c2056522"

Comment: certified NOT secure (Score 1) 90

by Kishin (#45009657) Attached to: Microsoft Azure Platform Certified "Secure" By Department of Defense
"The FedRAMP security assessment process defines a set of controls for low and moderate impact level systems based on NIST SP 800-53 controls." (FedRAMP Website) The key words here are "for LOW AND MODERATE impact level systems." Low and medium robustness are what the government usually accepts. All kinds of stuff that was routinely compromised fits that profile too. The Shapiro [1] paper on the Window's EAL4 evaluation illustrated why it actually meant "certified insecure" and sadly still applies to this one. At least the NIST standard has plenty of useful controls to keep out the riff raff attackers. The EAL7 or Orange Book A1 certification are very rigorous security standards. So few products reached that level that I could fit many of their names in a single tweet (97 characters actually). Cygnacom has a nice breakdown [2] of the assurance levels and extra work that must be done to verify the entire lifecycle to reach something resembling secure. Such solutions look... nothing like Azure. And Azure was neither built on such standards nor evaluated to one. It's not secure. QED. Nick P, Security Engineer, schneier.com contributer 1. http://www.eros-os.org/~shap/NT-EAL4.html/ 2. http://www.cygnacom.com/labs/cc_assurance_index/CCinHTML/PART3/PART36.HTM/ (Note: I originally posted this comment in the wrong spot. Reposting it here. Rarely use this comment system so my bad.)

Comment: certified NOT secure (Score 1) 90

by Kishin (#45009595) Attached to: Microsoft Azure Platform Certified "Secure" By Department of Defense
"The FedRAMP security assessment process defines a set of controls for low and moderate impact level systems based on NIST SP 800-53 controls." (FedRAMP Website) The key words here are "for LOW AND MODERATE impact level systems." Low and medium robustness are what the government usually accepts. All kinds of stuff that was routinely compromised fits that profile too. The Shapiro [1] paper on the Window's EAL4 evaluation illustrated why it actually meant "certified insecure" and sadly still applies to this one. At least the NIST standard has plenty of useful controls to keep out the riff raff attackers. The EAL7 or Orange Book A1 certification are very rigorous security standards. So few products reached that level that I could fit many of their names in a single tweet (97 characters actually). Cygnacom has a nice breakdown [2] of the assurance levels and extra work that must be done to verify the entire lifecycle to reach something resembling secure. Such solutions look... nothing like Azure. And Azure was neither built on such standards nor evaluated to one. It's not secure. QED. Nick P, Security Engineer, schneier.com contributer 1. http://www.eros-os.org/~shap/NT-EAL4.html/ 2. http://www.cygnacom.com/labs/cc_assurance_index/CCinHTML/PART3/PART36.HTM/

Comment: simple (Score 1) 238

by Kishin (#44314959) Attached to: Ask Slashdot: How Do You Automatically Sanitize PDF Email Attachments?
Use Foxit and keep javascript off by default. (Or don't even install the JavaScript plugin.) It's lightweight, fast and has fewer quality issues than adobe. Additionally, considering PDF is inherently an unsafe format, I'd say adding a sandbox like Sandboxie can help you. More technical people here might try porting a good PDF reader's key parsing and JS functionality to NaCl sandboxing system. Put each component in separate partitions with inner sandbox protection at a minimum. That lets us use the fast and legacy native code, but have plenty isolation almost for free. Nick P Security Engineer usually on schneier.com

Comment: RAM sled? (Score 1) 41

by Kishin (#43111339) Attached to: Facebook Details the Software Engineering Behind Graph Search
Re: "run it on a RAM sled with between 128 GB and 512 GB of memory" Google gave me absolutely nothing on RAM sleds. I've used RAM disks for years and even know of hard disk's that are flash-backed RAM for performance. 128GB-512GB of RAM? If I needed that in a server, SGI (rip) and others have it. I doubt that's what they mean, though, as it's expensive custom stuff. So, what is a RAM sled? And where are they bought or how are they set up? Thanks ahead of time for any answers.

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