I should say that I think a lot of the confusion comes in because it was a long talk covering a lot of different related topics, some related some not. There were bits covering calling IMSI info by acting as a tower, determining a phone's carrier by the block of numbers, the caller ID piece and more.
The article is BS and overblown. The talk itself was interesting.
The "find the name of the subscriber" bit has to do with the fact that a lot of carriers register the mobile phone subscribers name with the caller ID database. Since most cellphones don't use caller ID and only pair the number with their local address book, you wouldn't notice this unless the cellphone is calling your landline.
They demonstrated a technique to use a VOIP line to call another VOIP line spoofing the calling number (say 555-555-0001). They then harvested the caller ID info and moved onto the next number (555-555-0002), creating a massive database of number/name combinations.
Kind of like wardialing in reverse (cycling through source numbers not destinations).
A chip to offload encryption is a good thing, however it is not a "security chip". Security is a broad topic that this chip will barely touch.
Well, that would certainly drop the "distributed" part of DDoS.
Just secure your shit against DDoS attacks? Its not like they forgot to apply the "anti-ddos patch". Dealing with an attack from 100k+ hosts isn't something to be taken lightly. Its expensive (get a really fat pipe) and time consuming (identify and block attack traffic).
My math says 34.
I second Openfire. I set it up at work integrated into Active Directory for a user store, using Mysql replicating to a second box as a DR instance.
My server currently averages about 370 users per day or so, but I fully expect it to eventually handle the 1000+ employees in the company.
I don't use the chat logging functionality myself, but it is available in the product.
If you're using the Spark client you can also configure the FastPath plugin in order to create a "Live Support" chat queue for your helpdesk people so that other employees can talk to the next available person via a web interface.
I definitely disagree here. While passwords can be brute forced given enough time, your face is almost certainly available to someone who has access to get at your computer.
There is a difference between identification and authentication (your claim of who you are, and your proof of that claim). What you look like is identification.
Elmo knows where you live!
If a stranger hacks my WIFI encryption in my neighborhood and downloads child prOn, warez, illegal MP3, etc.. through my router/IP that DOES NOT mean that I did it and I AM NOT responsible for those communications/transfers as I have made reasonable accommodations to prevent that (plus I shutter to think that any of my neighbors are into any of that).
There's a difference between criminal liability and financial. You wouldn't be convicted of downloading child porn (or shouldn't be at least), but if your internet access was pay as you go, you may still be required to pay for the bandwidth used.
This certainly isn't the first time someone has exploited the phone system and stuck another with the bill. Maybe it's time for the phone company to get their fraud detection and prevention services at least on par with what the credit card companies have done.
As long as the customers are responsible for the charges, they have no business reason to invest in fraud protection.
Bruce Schenier refers to this as an externality, and had written about it a number of times in the context of credit card security and computer security.
EAP-TLS is used for the key exchange process. The encryption used for the connection can either be TKIP, which uses rotating RC4 keys or CCMP which uses more secure AES encryption keys.
CCMP is the more secure choice, but is incompatible with older wireless cards. If you care about the security of your network, you are better off choosing hardware that supports CCMP.