It presented a compelling case that the normal, large-scale warfare fought by organized armies which was the norm for most of the 20th century was obsolete in large part because the major powers, and the U.S. in particular, couldn't be beaten in that kind of war. The focus, then, had shifted to much smaller types of attacks frequently carried out by insurgents who were only loosely affiliated.
Many pundits have written that. It's been a subject of intense debate in military circles, and you can read some of the debate in publications like Parameters, the U.S. Army War College journal. Worth remembering, though, is that insurgency is an early phase of a conflict. If the insurgency succeeds, the conflict becomes territorial and more conventional. That happened in Vietnam (the final offensive against South Vietnam involved hundreds of tanks), and it's happening now as ISIL moves from an insurgency to a nation-state. Ukraine is more of a proxy war, but it's about territory. Remember that Russia has already taken over Crimea.
Most of the potential wars in East Asia are straight nation-state conflicts. Taiwan/China, N.Korea/S.Korea, and China/Japan have no insurgent components.