The Jade Rabbit is the best vibrator I've ever owned. Do yourself a favor and get one (or two!). They go great on the clit, in the pussy, in the ass, tickling the dick or nipples, and (my personal favorite) pressed up tight against your taint, just under the scrotum.
But they really don't work well when it's 100K. Of course, if you were to touch your taint with an object at that temperature, I think you might get a variant of the tongue-on-flagpole effect, much to your displeasure.
I agree - teach the contraversy. We have seen enough things fall by the wayside in the history of science that we should not consider anything with reverance, e.g. flat earth, sun circles the earth, etc.
Teach the scientific method and let the kids sort it out!
You do realize that all the theories you mentioned were originally held and taught by religious fanatics, right? Not sure if that was your point or not...
The original framers of the constitution recognized this at the founding of the republic.
"The Congress shall have Power To...promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries...."
Nobody objects to people having the protection of a limited copyright so that they can profit from their ideas. Everyone - including, I'd argue, most copyright holders but excepting apparently their very successful lobbyists and tame congresspeople - agrees that "copyright" != "rights to exclusivity in perpetuity so that person and their heirs never have to work again".
You do realize that SCOTUS has ruled that limited times is subject to the "I'll know it when I see it" rule of being out of bounds. They have yet to see a number that they've declared limited. Of course, it's all about perspective. In a geologic time scale, then 100 years is very "limited".
What I would like to see is a "short-circut" timer based on dates of publication. If a work is not published at all (made available to the public in some form), then it gets a shorter protection time. Once a work is published, the date it is no longer available (ie, the book goes out of print, the software is no longer sold), then another timer starts - you have X amount of time to re-publish it (say 10 years) or it passes into the public domain.
As Regan looked at the world through the fog of dementia and dirty windows at the White House he couldn't distinguish between movie scripts and reality. (Remember the refit of the New Jersey?) It seems that Cameron has lost more than a few brain cells too.
This is what happens when the GCHQ uses the neuralizer too much.
Following the link referenced we get: "From the statistics below (collected from W3Schools' log-files over a period of ten years), you can read the long term trends of browser usage."
So this data set really shows only the behavior of access to the w3schools.com site. Don't make inferences across the general population.
I also note that they don't say WHAT drives that percentage? Is it based on IP addresses or raw page views? Could it be that Chrome users have to look up how to do basic web crap more often? Maybe IE dropped because those on Windows platforms are using Visual Stdio with its own built-in help. There is no way you can make any educated inferences from this data. This is another stunt to get Slashdot pageviews.
Yes, but remember "Developers, Developers, Developers!". If the developers start abandoning IE, then your platform will no longer have the best experience and further encouage users to move to others, like Firefox/Chrome.
This is simply saying that most developers use something besides IE for their day-to-day browsing activities (and/or help lookup). This does not say anything about the browser mix that they have to (a) design for, or (b) test with. This is like looking at the White House and saying that the Congress must not have any Republicans.
So you decrypt something and it *looks* like real data.
So it would have to be a function that produces 'good' results and 'bad results' but the bad results look like good ones.
Would have to be careful that the 'bad' results do not do things like open the lock though. For instant in the case of login list breaches.
If randomly generated "fake" data matches someone else's password (or whatever is being encrypted), that other person didn't use a strong enough password. This system is just acting like a hash function -- criminal tries password A and he decrypts the data to some string, then he tries password B and the data gets decrypted to another string. If those randomly generated strings happen to match someone elses password on the system, the criminal could have saved himself some time by generating the password guesses himself.
What's the goal here - to make the returned data "not my data", or "incorrect data"? There is a world of difference between these two. "Not my data" is a simple thing to generate, but could still be correct data. IE, if the data protected is a card number, and the generated number matches someone else's card, then do we care or not? The criminal doesn't care, as long as their goal is met (get a valid card - it doesn't have to be yours). If we're talking about "invalid" data, then we need some mechanism to validate the generated data before it's returned. While this wouldn't meet the criminal's goal, it could open a possible DDOS attack vector on the validation service (ie, a brute force becomes a magnified reflection attack).
They aren't going to store a big database of valid credit card numbers so they can return someone else's card number, they'll just generate a random number that looks like it could be a real credit card number and passes the checksum test.
Yes, a criminal could take the credit card numbers from each decryption attempt and test them, but if he's willing to test millions of card numbers to look for a valid one, he could just generate the card numbers directly and not attempt the decryption in the first place.
If we're simply returning a random string that "looks" valid, then this method of protection works. If we return a known invalid number, then we now have a test that the attacker can use to validate the password input. It does take one additional step (validate the result).
I guess it DOES have some benefit, huh?
People misunderstand what "security through obscurity" means. Most (all?) encryption relies on security through obscurity at some level.
Hiding your house key under a loose floorboard in your back deck is the kind of security through obscurity that can really work, assuming that there are no other clues that lead to the hiding place. However, hiding the prybar that you use to pry up the floorboard under the belief that hiding the method of access makes your key safer is not the kind of obscurity that works because if the attacker can find your hiding place, he can figure another way to get to the key.
Similarly, hiding or not writing down your password is security through obscurity that works. But trying to hide the implementation details of your cipher algorithm does not, because cryptoanalysis can break your encryption even without access to your encryption algorithm.
So, obscuring your real password among an endless number of fake passwords is the kind of obscurity that can work -- even if the attacker knows that your password is somewhere among the billions of fake ones, unless he has some clue to tell him what your real password looks like, just knowing that fakes are there doesn't help him.
Of course, they could use the prybar to simply break a window, or pry open the door, invalidating the purpose of the hiding place entirely. So hiding the prybar, while it doesn't directly affect the hiding space, helps increase overall security of the system.
So you decrypt something and it *looks* like real data.
So it would have to be a function that produces 'good' results and 'bad results' but the bad results look like good ones.
Would have to be careful that the 'bad' results do not do things like open the lock though. For instant in the case of login list breaches.
If randomly generated "fake" data matches someone else's password (or whatever is being encrypted), that other person didn't use a strong enough password. This system is just acting like a hash function -- criminal tries password A and he decrypts the data to some string, then he tries password B and the data gets decrypted to another string. If those randomly generated strings happen to match someone elses password on the system, the criminal could have saved himself some time by generating the password guesses himself.
What's the goal here - to make the returned data "not my data", or "incorrect data"? There is a world of difference between these two. "Not my data" is a simple thing to generate, but could still be correct data. IE, if the data protected is a card number, and the generated number matches someone else's card, then do we care or not? The criminal doesn't care, as long as their goal is met (get a valid card - it doesn't have to be yours). If we're talking about "invalid" data, then we need some mechanism to validate the generated data before it's returned. While this wouldn't meet the criminal's goal, it could open a possible DDOS attack vector on the validation service (ie, a brute force becomes a magnified reflection attack).
I don't think you can blame the parents for "fucking over" the donor: it's the Kansas Department for Children and Families that has brought the case, and the recipients of the funds may not have a say in the matter.
And the Kansas Department for Children and Families is completely right about this: Two persons cannot make any contract or agreement that takes away the rights of a third person. It is the right of the child to get support from his biological parents. The mother cannot decide that the child should not exercise this right. Even as a legal guardian of the child she can only make decisions for the child that are in the interest of the child. But not getting support from the child's farther is in the interest of the mother but not in the interest of the child.
Then all adoptions are illegal and invalid. Your assumption is wrong.
Virgin Mary story would have lost them benefits from the state. This is a story of the Govt controlling who can have kids and who can't and one could even argue it's discrimination by the govt, because by saying "all your signed legal donor contracts are worthless" the govt is essentially saying "sorry lesbians if you want children you better pay $20,000+ for artificial insemination from a doctor" and requiring same sex couples to pay $20,000 or their child isn't really theirs is a great way to prevent same sex couples from having children at all. With the court ruling the father is still legally the father in this case means any same sex couple who had a child without artifical insemination could face a custody battle someday.
To prevent kids from being on welfare, we should require that parents deposit $100,000 with DCF before they are allowed to have unprotected sex. If they can't afford that, they can't afford to pay for the kids, and should be forcibly sterilized so we don't have all these children in poverty. It's for the children! WHY DON'T YOU THINK OF THE CHILDREN!?
The agency said it also received different versions of the donor contract from Marotta and Schreiner, suggesting that the document "may be invalid on its face."
Had the contracts matched and been witnessed by doctor or even a $15 public notary then the outcome may have been different.
This is the true issue in this case. There are multiple versions of the contract, and each party has a differing version. In these cases there are two tracks for the court to take - attempt to reconcile them, or throw the contract out. Sounds like the court took the easy way out and tossed the contract, which invalidates the parental rights transfer. I will note that adoption and donation contracts are the most legally scrutinized contracts due to the impact on many lives. If there's t's dotted and i's crossed it will probably be tossed. Writing your own contract for donation or adoption is a very bad idea - as these people are finding out.
I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning. -- Plato
