I'm probably going to get modded down for this, but it needs to be said:
a doctor diagnosing patients in the rural areas of Africa or a Homeland Security agent working to thwart an act of bioterrorism
One of these doesn't belong. I'll give you a hint: There are billions of one (that we don't hear enough about from anyone), and like three of the other (that we hear way too much about from certain mainstream media sources).
Obviously you've never run a BBS in the old days...
Neither have 99% of the e-mail-using public, so I fail to see how your arguments are relevant to modern-day technology and privacy issues, especially in the context of the 4th amendment where the concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy" factors in.
...require extraordinary evidence.
Or you may have
- poor apps whose layout breaks at low DPI
- poor apps that don't resize icons for lower resolutions
- apps that down-sample resolution poorly
etc.
And so people should run their screens at high resolution. Not.
The point is that you shouldn't have to change your resolution or worry about resolution or its affect on your apps. The OS should put the resolution at an optimal value for the monitor that you are using. That's what Fedora does for me.
A GUI or app that assumes a fixed resolution or font size is a poor app. If you don't use or buy them they will go away.
I think you mean capitalism (mostly the same thing, but sure). You know, the whole, priced to what the market will bear nonesense that is the fundemental underpinnings of our economy. In this case, the cost of batteries for garden tools is lower because NiCa and other technologies are still viable alternatives, whereas in the laptop segment they are not. In other words, there are more competitors and a higher supply in one market segment than another.
This idea is impractical in so many ways. Leaving aside the privacy issues raised by the prerequisite of collecting the kinds of information the author mentions, he makes far too many assumptions (and of course, does not back them up with any hard facts).
Even if his assumptions are partially correct, he fails to factor in how real security software interacts with real users. Modern viruses are very fluid things, and thus modern virus detection is non-deterministic (and so is this author's system as far as I can tell). So in order to catch all viruses a certain level of false positives will inevitably arise. And it doesn't take many false positives before the user starts to ignore the warnings.
Our business in life is not to succeed but to continue to fail in high spirits. -- Robert Louis Stevenson