Which lessons learned... (Score 1)

I may be stating the obvious, but I don't expect Orion or any of these new launch vehicles to be completed, but that may be a good thing. The idea of placing highly skilled, highly trained volunteers on top of a giant firecracker is ridiculous. Solid propellents are accidents waiting to happen and that's why military weapon systems drop or boost rocket powered munitions away from the delivery vehicle before they ignite. That's also why those "solid rocket engines" are manufactured in desolate area's of the Southwest and shipped in secure containers. In stark contrast the proposed heavy lift booster continues to be a liquid core vehicle. I personally take issue with the philosophy of placing equipment, not humans on the safer of the two vehicles. These kind of decisions are also indicative of political "grand standing." First lay out a "grand plan for glory," then set a time-table for shutting down a working system, while only "starting" work on the means to achieve the goal. The current administration will not be in office when NASA comes asking for financing to build hardware, so these actions will likely play out as a politically correct method for shutting down the Shuttle program. At some future date I am sure a politician will step forward and claim this action as proof of there effort at "reducing government waste." What's that you say? They already built the Orion capsule... NOT. A "mockup" is not a finished and tested product. That thing is not even an alpha build, it's a Powerpoint show at best. This whole process compares to Microsoft being contracted by the US government to investigate replicating the IBM360. They may get a workable device out of the exercise but the world will have moved on and past glory will be forgotten. The ingenious exploitation of available resources to meet human needs has been a major driver of all know civilizations. The exploitation of space resources has payed for our current level of space exploration, so I don't expect this trend to change. Progress will only happen at a greater level than we currently know when we can routinely travel to space, work there and come back. That means building the equivalent to the DC-3 or B727, because disposable vehicles are a huge waste of funds and resources. There is plenty of documentation to show how and where mistakes were made in creating the Shuttle and that documentation indicates that under-funding and politics were key to it's failure. Engineers and program manager must learn the lessons of economics, finance and politics in order to change the world. Repeating pst mistakes and basing decisions on cheapness will only guarantee failure.