I would be happy with a chip proof windshield!

The other change beyond the funding quantity was the prestige of advancement beyond just been invited in for signals support or an archive function for other expert mil and gov work.
Real time work, setting policy was the new upgrade. New systems, contractors, linguistics, networks.
The domestic and international telco networks as they have existed and exist now are not a problem in terms of scale or access for the NSA and GCHQ.
Collect it all has always worked well given the all digital systems and funding.
Bulk collection has never been a problem since the 1930's for the USA. The UK and US did have a few Russian and Korean language issues back in the 1950's due to all the information been collected. That was quickly fixed.
The only question that has existed is what the press and historians understand. The UK view was that no signals collection material was to ever to been seen in any public court setting or commented on. Collect it all would not exist in the UK as public policy. The US is now talking of public lock boxes for all telco use been open to courts and devices sold with gov backdoors, trapdoors to reverse any crypto as used.
Watching the Soviet Union was not never a problem of how or been in need of more equipment. Understanding all US domestic and international calls was never a problem over many decades. The real question was the use of the result (ever more closed court use) or and who in mil/gov gets to set and shape policy.
Who will see the better result?
The classic UK view of letting people just use the telephone and networks as normal while collecting all? The results been used with great care as to never offer any public insight into what was done..
Or the US public talk of gov keys kept for consumer crypto and huge telco databases open to courts over decades? The public fully understanding their new phone/crypto is a tool of the gov/mil as sold.

A digital Berlin wall to find whistleblowers on any network and a new generation of private company boondoggle funding.
Contractors and mil systems that once faced the Soviet Union are now invited in for domestic use via new "portals".
Some Freedom of Information Act provision might allow for talking about projects historically but less of the secure in papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches domestically.
The collective agencies are free from antitrust scrutiny, liability and are free use the cyberthreat, cybercrime aspects as desired domestically.

Infiltration worked so well. Cooperation, leniency for working with the gov. Years of free charming, charismatic chatroom leaders and their accomplishments, forums and gov funded onion networks.
Once a person and all their data is lost the only hope is a "security check" word, phrase. Something that can be added or left out that shows duress or coercion.
That was the past.
Now with OS, hardware and telco collaboration expect every consumer device to have a backdoor or trap door as sold.
The backdoor or trap door would have been expected for the security services at a national level.
Now that same level of expert contractor is ready for state, city and local law enforcement use on any device recovered.
The same offer of cooperation, leniency, working with the gov will be made and a 'show' about needing the passwords over hours and much longer.
The device, network is open in seconds and the isolated holding time is been put to use.
The new trend is movement around a city with no access to any lawyer for many hours..
Just before some legal time limit for court documentation a person is released or the lawyer is finally allowed access for the first formal recorded interview.

The US West German and German links go back generations.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
After the 1970's East Germany was not of any new interest to the UK and USA as all Soviet and East German signals where fully tracked. West Germany policy on the US and UK was of more interest to the US and UK.
Tornado jet sales, the UK East German diplomatic recognition, West German political moves surrounding the UK role in the Common Market.
Generations of West German experts helped the US and UK find out what was needed over many decades in West Germany.
The next move by the NSA and GCHQ was to pull West Germany deeper into a "third party" collection into the 1980's.
West Germany would get US export grade mil systems in exchange for all US/UK access to emerging West Germany telco networks.
What Germany now has is the product of past ww2 politics and generations of total telco collaboration by West/Germans for the US and UK.
Tame crypto and all political telco networks totally linked to the US and UK.

We have been well trained that it is OK for the good guys to bend the rules to stop the bad guys. Of course how can you be you are the good guys? https://www.youtube.com/watch?...

Access to voice, text, location, ip is all that is needed. The ability to collect it all is a given over decades in real time for the UK. Interception techniques have kept pace thanks to sigint modernisation like programmes.
What a network looks like the public or is said in public has no relation to any telco network that is totally open to the security services by design.

The UK has had total access to all communications networks in the UK since WW1.
Defence of the Realm Act 1914 gave vast new powers. HOW (Home Office Warrant) like use was expanded into the 1950's and beyond.
The UK had total mastery of all emerging telco sat systems in the 1960's, CSO Morwenstow/GCHQ Bude.
Irelands telco networks (domestic and all connections in and out) where all well understood.
As internet use, desktop crypto and mobile phone use became more common the UK had a few ideas about how to help with the creation of Government Technical Assistance Centre, later the NTAC (National Technical Assistance Centre).
All mobiles sold in the UK by default have been ready for intercept by design as set out in standards and international standards.
The use of early 1990's voice print technology and a new generation of cell site simulators have allowed the total collection of mobile calls all over UK cities for years.
Consumer grade computers with tame OS, weak default junk consumer grade crypto and expert malware have allowed any domestic computer system to be accessed by default over many years.
Networking anonymity is not an issues for the UK. The only real issues the UK has ever had with communications has been the Soviet Unions correct use of one time pads and number stations since the 1950's.
The SIGMOD initiative (sigint modernisation programme) has ensured the UK will never be without a total understanding of any type network in/out of the UK.
In the past years social media has been as open to courts as ever. OS developers ship the same standard of basic consumer grade protections with their desktop computers and seem as happy as ever to offer voice, keylogging, plain text and other access when requested by a UK court.
Mobile devices have always been and always will be open to any court request for all data, voice, location, images or telco network support to track, log.
Privacy is a useless concept when a UK court demands access in the UK on a UK network or any device sold, used or connected in the UK.
Any fancy imported crypto app layer is reduced to junk with keystrokes or voice been recorded by malware at a hardware or tame lower software/network/OS level.
The same level of access to text and calls will always exist on public/private networks thanks to international standards and all devices sold been intercept ready by design.
OS, networks, social media, telcos will never be a problem in real time for the UK.

Because "Mobile Friendly Pages" suck great green donkey balls. Even on mobile, most of the time. So Google is saying "Make your website suck for better search rankings!" And people will...

So you want websites to double their development costs and keep two parallel sites up to day? That will work for about a month, and they the bosses will say "Just make one site that works (badly) on everything."

Bing. Seriously... Using it more will help it learn. All search engines track what you actually pick, so they improve with use.

This right here! I am seriously fucking tired of everyone trying to turn my large screen high def computer into a fucking phone! There is a reason I do not browse the web on a "smart" phone. A 4 inch screen sucks! And when I can not get out of your "mobile optimized" site on my large tablet, guess what? I find another!

Now part of the DRT box, device or dirtboxes ie cell site simulators. Some are fixed-site, tactical trailer ready or man-packable.
What was big for Iraq and Afghanistan is now back for domestic use. Data visualisation, graphs, geospatial maps are all in the mix depending on what is offered. Mix in private databases, purchased data for phone numbers.
The US seems to have been early with it but the US is now finding other nations efforts locally.
The other side is the wired versions for any/all Public Switched Telephone Network efforts.

Re Finding?
"This machine catches stingrays: Pwnie Express demos cellular threat detector" (Apr 21, 2015)
http://arstechnica.com/informa...
Looks for Unauthorized or unknown cell providers, Anomalous or suspicious base stations, IMSI catcher/interceptor identification, Rogue or malicious cellular base stations.