OpenSSL's RNG is used in many places separately from the SSL communication protocol itself, sometimes just for encryption in general (S/MIME) or sometimes someone just wants really random bytes.
Many servers fork twice in order to reparent to init, repeated forking is a common idiom in unixland.
Apache with MPM-prefork forks a bunch of children from a master process, which is typically itself a descendant of apachectl. In apache's case, this shouldn't be a problem since the "master-process-rng" would have recognized the fork and reinitialized on the first openssl connection, so the children are protected because they cannot have the same PID as the master-process.
Where it would be a problem would be an application or daemon that starts up, initializes the RNG, forks twice, then without this fork touching the RNG, starts forking children to do something random (say, encrypting one file per process or establishing a single SSL connection per process or something). Without having the RNG reset by the master process, one in 65534 or so processes will have the exact same RNG, because it will have inherited the original RNG untouched and be assigned the PID that created the RNG.