This isn't a political group. It is a group of law enforcement + technical experts. Their programme says that they are looking into the technical aspects, starting from the assumption that it isn't technically feasible, and seeing if they can think of a way of doing it.

Once they've done that, they'll report back to the politicians (well, the civil servants first) to say whether or not it can be done proportionately, and then it becomes a political issue if their answer is that it can be done, and those in charge still want to look into it.

I don't think the group is in a position to actually come up with any actual technology; just theories. They're starting from a point of "there is no way of doing this," not "there is nothing on the market that we could use", so they are being asked to come up with concepts, and asses their feasibility. I think, based on that, the other stuff I've read about ENLETS and the BBC's version of the story.

Even if the 8 of them did somehow invent a major piece of technology and be able to build it, that wouldn't be that different from any random inventors coming up with it, aside from the fact that they are being funded partly by the EU budget. And I don't see a problem with people seeing if this is possible, or could work. The decision as to whether it should be used or mandated is for the elected politicians and so on, not the technical experts.

Most of that stems from the Telegraph article, though. And I'm not sure it is a good idea to trust the Telegraph on anything relating to the EU. The BBC's version of the story has a few more facts and sources, and a bit less outrage.

This story is mostly nonsense.

There's a thing called ENLETS (or European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services), which is meant to be "the leading European platform that strengthens police cooperation and bridges the gap between the users and providers of law enforcement technology." From what I can tell it is a sort of advisory committee of law enforcement technology experts, working through Europol, who brainstorm how to use technology to help law enforcement stuff. Currently it gets about €600k in funding, mostly from the EU, some from the UK and the Netherlands. They're asking for that to be increased to €915k. Most of that seems to be in hiring some new full-time advisers; from their personnel costs, they want about 8 people working full time; a leader, a policy officer, and admin person and 5 senior advisers. So if they don't get their budget increase, there's a good chance none of this stuff will happen.

This article is based on a "secret" document (which I think is this one), which is a (draft?) work programme for the group for 2014-2020; so what they're supposed to be looking at.

This document stems from a recommendation by the Council of the European Union that ENLETS look into this kind of thing - the instructions etc. can be found here (or if that doesn't work, search for document 12103/13 on their search page). They asked ENLETS to monitor and coordinate the development of new technologies.

The actual "secret" document is listed on the Council's website (do a search for 17365/13) as "Law Enforcement Technology Services (ENLETS) 2014 - 2020 - Work programme", but the document itself isn't accessible. I don't know whether that's because it's such a minor report (and not really an official EU thing) that they haven't bothered uploading it, or if they are claiming it should be withheld; I'm tempted to make a formal request for it to see what they say.

The five short-term goals they have been asked to look at are in some places a bit scary:

1. Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) - ANPR is well established in many MS. In 2013/14 ENLETS will support those MS who feel the need to enhance their capabilities by sharing best practices. The ANPR systems will be measured by its maturity, capabilities and their deployment.
2. Open Source Intelligence - Open source intelligence is a prioritized topic due to the evolving internet and wireless communication systems. For law enforcement it is a source of information as well as a method of communication. Open source intelligence relates to frontline policing (events, crowd control) and criminal investigations (search for evidence, monitoring and surveillance). In this project the handling of open sources will be assessed and ranked.
3. Signal Intelligence - Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) deploy many kinds of sensors, mostly connected to their IT systems. The sensors need to enhance the operational capability of the LEAs, but often the integration of these sensors and IT systems cause technological problems. Frequently sensor data cannot be integrated, stored or displayed due to the design, protocols and construction of IT systems. What kind of signal intelligence is the most operationally effective and open for integrating the sensors in the EU? What kind of concept will be needed as ever more data is forwarded for processing and more information needs to be analysed?
4. Surveillance - Surveillance uses many types of technology. In this topic focus will be on sharing the best video systems (quality, performance in several scenarios). The purpose of this topic is to match the best standards in video used by the industry to the end user requirements. Privacy enhanced technology and transparency are key issues.
5. Remote Stopping Vehicles - Cars on the run have proven to be dangerous for citizens. Criminal offenders (from robbery to a simple theft) will take risks to escape after a crime. In most cases the police are unable to chase the criminal due to the lack of efficient means to stop the vehicle safely. This project starts with the knowledge that insufficient technology tools are available to be used as part of a proportionate response. This project will work on a technological solution that can be a “build in standard” for all cars that enter the European market.

To me, 2 looks a bit worrying, but the rest seem to be about finding the most efficient way of doing what is already done, and getting different EU organisations using similar standards. The 5th, which is the one that has caused all this fuss, seems the most theoretical; noting that there is no way of doing this sensibly, so seeing if they can think of a way. Actually coming up with something, and convincing the politicians and parliamentarians to implement it will take quite a while.

So, "EU Secretly Plans to put a back door in every car by 2020" is pretty much nonsense; an advisory committee of a thing that sometimes works for the EU has been asked by a bit of the EU to look into technological solutions for law enforcement issues, and as one of their agenda items, had decided to see if there is a way to achieve this in a proportionate and practical way.

I have a feeling that it is "secret" in the sense that the Telegraph has only just found out about it, and has decided it is a great way of generating outrage at the EU. Like their nonsense story about EU plans to put GPS speed limiters in all cars, or the Daily Mails story about the EU planning a "soviet-style brainwashing" education campaign for children.

As usual, the truth is more complicated, and the legal situation isn't clear and unambiguous.

This law has been in force for over a decade, and there have been a few convictions using this law, and a couple of appeals. The quote from Marttinen v Finland is lifted almost straight from Saunders v UK , where there was similarly a breach of Article 6 through the use of self-incrimination. However, as the Court notes in paragraph 69 of Marttinen, "not all coercive measures give rise to the conclusion of an unjustified interference with the right not to incriminate oneself," again referring back to Saunders.

The issue of whether this law is an unjustified interference with the privilege against self-incrimination (either under English common law, or Article 6 of the ECHR) was discussed by the English Court of Appeal in R v S & Anor back in 2008. The Court found that this law didn't necessarily engage the privilege against self-incrimination (applying both UK law and Saunders), arguing that the passwords existed independent of the defendants' wills; "The actual answers [given by the defendants; i.e. the passwords], that is to say the product of the appellants' minds could not, of themselves, be incriminating. The keys themselves simply open the locked drawer, revealing its contents."

The Court's position seems to be that the passwords themselves aren't incriminating, it is the material on the computers that is. Therefore divulging the password isn't necessarily self-incrimination. However, the Court did note that it could be that the defendant's knowledge of the passwords could be incriminating (e.g. if the prosecution needed to use it to prove that the defendant had created etc. the encrypted files) - in such a case then the defendant's knowledge of the password wouldn't be admissible as evidence, protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. Similarly, if there was an issue with disclosing the password being incriminating for another reason, other evidence could be declared inadmissible. The privilege against self-incrimination doesn't mean you can't be made to tell the police stuff, but that self-incriminating stuff coerced out of you can't (always) be used against you in a criminal trial.

The Court then went on to discuss whether, even if the privilege was engaged, the law was a "proportionate and permissible" interference with it - and they found that it was, due to the limits on it, what it achieved and the various procedural safeguards in place.

I'm not sure I'm entirely convinced by the argument, or the analogy with the key to a locked draw, or a blood sample to show blood alcohol levels, but I think it is far from clear that this law breaks Article 6. It would, however, be useful to get clarification from the ECtHR either way.

Unless the prosecution can convince a jury beyond reasonable doubt that you haven't forgotten the passwords, they can't convict you.

Similarly, if you filled a device with random data, they'd have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it contained the information they were after. If you could stand up in court and say it was random data, maybe with something to back you up (you could probably use this post?), you would probably be fine.

If not, the maximum sentence is 2 years, or 5 years if the matter relates to national security or possession or distribution of indecent photographs of children (although, interestingly, not in cases of actual child abuse). That's if it goes to a jury. On summary conviction the maximum is 6 months.

Which isn't to say you wouldn't face months if not years pre-trial, under investigation, with expensive and draconian bail conditions, unable to do much, with your life being destroyed, plus have to face the massive legal fees required to defend yourself... but that's the UK criminal justice system for you.

It's a maximum of 2 years, or 5 years in "national security" or "child indecency" cases. See section 53(5A). Prison terms in the UK run concurrently, not consecutively, so no matter how many pieces of media were found, it would be a maximum of 2 or 5 years.

I can't speak for this specific case (the parent has more information than I do), but in one of the few other cases of this law being used (one that got appealed on the grounds of it breaching the privilege against self-incrimination), I think the prosecution were able to show that the defendant was at his computer, in the process of entering the password when the police turned up to arrest him. That may have been enough to convince a jury beyond reasonable doubt that he knew the password.

I think that in at least some of the other cases (there aren't many), there have been defendants making it clear that they refused to disclose the password on principle. In others it may be possible to show that the defendant accessed the data (and therefore used the password) shortly before the order for disclosure was issued. Basically it comes down to being able to convince a jury beyond reasonably doubt that the defendant knew the password.

And it seems the court didn't believe him... which they do. And I imagine they have far more relevant facts than we do.

This change to the law does extend (some) copyrights by 20 years, and in some cases, indefinitely (in the sense of for a currently undefined period, rather than for ever), and in a few cases, pulling works previously in the public domain back into copyright.

The Regulations in question do several things, and there is a lot of misinformation going around about this (including in the summary above; I haven't read the CNN article).

The new EU law extends the copyright and performance rights (which are different things that usually go to different people) in certain sound recordings by 20 years. But as a compromise, adds new reversion etc. powers for the performance rights only, for the last 20 years only. So if someone performs for a sound recording today, and waives their performance rights, in 50 (to 100) years they might be able to do something.

The recent release (probably) wasn't anything to do with the change in the law, but the way the existing law words. The copyright in the sound recordings lasts for 50 years (technically, as with all of these, 50 + the rest of that year). However, if the work is legally published or performed in public during that period, the copyright lasts an extra 70 (was 50) years. So had Apple Corp. released these sound recordings next month, the copyright (in the sound recordings, but not in the underlying songs; they last the full "life + 70") would have expired on 31 December 2013. But by releasing them this month, the copyright will last until 31 December 2083 (assuming no changes in the law).

It is hard to see the decision to publish in December 2013 (verses any other time in the last 50 years) as anything other than a way to maximise the copyright duration, and thus the book value of the copyright.

But yes, if the work wasn't published, "control" over the sound recordings would have resorted to whoever holds the copyright in the underlying songs - which may be some of the individual Beatles or might be Michael Jackson's estate, as I understand he owned some of the copyrights.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced_adoption_in_the_United_Kingdom - oh look, it's the same names. John Hemming, Christopher Booker. Funny that... it's almost as if there's no real story there, just something being pushed by a few individuals on a crusade.

Like preventing adults from viewing porn without having to register as a pervert by british authorities first.

Nope. That's not happening.

And of course now they extend these laws to any inconvenient webcontent whatsoever.

Nor that, really...

The Guardian left its co.uk domain because of the pressure of the fascist government reigning in the UK.

More likely due to not wanting to run the risk of breaking UK law; obviously they would have been able to challenge it in court (and might have won), but it was easier to move. They still have their headquarters in the UK, obviously.

I'm not sure if there are any specific accusations; yes, the UK Government spies on people (including its own). Yes, many of us aren't happy about it, and are trying to sort out roughly what they can and can't do. Which is why I didn't question the "surveillance" part of what you said. Although we have done quite a good job of keeping that limited to the intelligence services, rather than other public bodies.

If you're going to criticise the UK Government for bad policies, go ahead (I certainly do). But please try to get real ones. Like new rules that would install automatic notice-and-takedown systems on all online comments/posts, or giving police and/or local authorities curfew and dispersion powers, or removing appeal options in immigration cases, limiting the right of judicial review, threatening to repeal the Human Rights Act, removing legal aid in a huge range of cases, denying prisoners the right to vote...

They refused to give the child to other members of her family because they were not related by blood. Interesting point of view. And they did send her back to italy but are giving the child free for adoption in UK.

... according to the author of the original article. Who has a history of publishing misleading accounts of English family law cases, almost certainly wasn't in the court room, and probably has got most of his information from an informal conversation with a solicitor in the new case (challenging the adoption).

Which is why it is worth waiting for more facts before leaping to conclusions.

They are taking the child out of his culture and are forcing it to live in a fascist surveillance state with no more human rights left whatsoever.

I'm all for criticising the current UK Government and its political position on human rights, but the UK Government is not fascist and has a pretty strong human rights record (over the last 15-60 years). The child will have the standard ECHR human rights.

Before you get too outraged about that story, the only facts we have at the moment about it come from a Telegraph writer and an MP who both have a history of misreporting family law decisions (they're are part of a group dedicated to changing the English family law system), and who have both been singled out in High Court judgments for doing so. At the moment the story is designed to be as outrage-inducing as possible, while short on facts (particularly given that most of them will be confidential/sealed).

The basis of the story sounds pretty shocking (a court-ordered caesarean), but if you can accept that sometimes a caesarean is necessary or in a person's best interests, and can accept that some people (due to their health) are not able to make medical decisions for themselves, it isn't impossible that this could be a reasonable decision.

His episodes tend to have "big red buttons" which fix things, but they tend to be worked into the story right from the beginning and make sense, rather than being a magic fix-everything solution from the last five minutes.

His buttons are the kind of buttons where, after they're pressed, you realise that they were there all along, and obvious if you'd thought about it in the right way. Although that isn't always the case.

This latest episode sort of broke that, though; it had a Big Red Button to fix stuff, but the ended up not pressing it and coming up with a random fanservicey way of solving everything in the last couple of minutes (in an even better way). But that was kind of worth it for the fanservice.

The Swedish systems allows for this, so while it may not be corrupt, its laws are not the same as in the U.S.

If it helps, what he is accused of was also found to be rape under English law, and may well be rape under other laws, so it isn't necessarily the case that Swedish laws are different, or particularly unusual.

The accusation of rape (translated into English for the High Court) reads as follows:

On 17 August 2010, in the home of the injured party [SW] in Enkoping, Assange deliberately consummated sexual intercourse with her by improperly exploiting that she, due to sleep. was in a helpless state. ... The sexual act was designed to violate the injured party's sexual integrity.

To me that seems to have the key issues of sex and a lack of consent, that tend to be the corner-stone of definitions of rape. Whether or not there was consent (or the events actually happened) is obviously a question for trial.

I'm not an expert on Swedish criminal procedure, but the willingness of the "injured parties" to "file charges" is usually irrelevant in criminal justice systems. The state brings the charges, the "injured parties" may be witnesses, if needed.

Actually there isn't such a thing in most of Europe any more (in theory). In July the ECtHR ruled that life-long prison sentence must be reducible or it amounts to inhumane/degrading treatment (contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR). The case was Vinter v UK, you can find the full judgment here and a summary here. The best tl;dr is probably this quote from the latter:

There were a number of reasons why, for a life sentence to remain compatible with Article 3, there had to be both a prospect of release and a possibility of review. Firstly, it was axiomatic that a prisoner could not be detained unless there were legitimate penological grounds for that detention. The balance between the justifications for detention was not necessarily static and could shift in the course of the sentence. It was only by carrying out a review at an appropriate point in the sentence that these factors or shifts could be properly evaluated. Secondly, incarceration without any prospect of release or review carried the risk that the prisoner would never be able to atone for his offence, whatever he did in prison and however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation. Thirdly, it would be incompatible with human dignity for the State forcefully to deprive a person of his freedom without at least providing him with the chance to someday regain that freedom. Moreover, there was now clear support in European and international law for the principle that all prisoners, including those serving life sentences, should be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release if rehabilitation was achieved.

But that has been seen by some as classic European, human-rights, wishy-washy liberalism at its finest. It doesn't that people can't be locked up for life, but if they are, there has to be some review process and some way (more than merely theoretical) that they can "earn" their release.