Comment Re:Headline misleading (Score 1) 437
to simply go after cheaters is putting a band-aid over the real problem.
I disagree. Some portion of students will cheat as long as (in theory):
[benefit of higher grade] - [cost of honestly achieving higher grade] > {[benefit of cheating] - [cost of cheating]} * [ risk of getting caught cheating] * [value of punishment for cheating].
The real problem is that people are lazy and want to get the best return for the smallest investment. This cannot be fixed, it is human nature.
So we tip the equation in favor of not cheating, by either/and
1. Making the punishment so extreme (expulsion) that even if the risk of getting caught is low, cheating is not a good idea. The problem with this approach is that as the risks of getting caught decrease, people dismiss the risk as zero. This is a known problem with how humans interpret probability and risk dealing with VLNs and VSNs.
2. Increasing the chance of being caught. This is a problem because of the costs involved, as well as an "arms race" between proctors and students.
Note that the equation is also affected by the fact that cheating has become easier, and thus cheaper. There is also a factor for personal inhibitions against cheating, but I'm not sure how to fit it into the model.
PS. sorry for the messy formula.
Actually the model would be:
Cheating and not getting caught = CNGC
Cheating and getting caught = CGC
Expected[Utility CNGC] = (1- Probability[CGC])*[Utility CNGC] > Expected[Utility CGC] = [Probability CGC]*[Utility CGC]
where [Utility CNCG] = f([how much work was done]; [utility of higher grades]; [Utility of the act of cheating independently of its outcome])
Your model describes the decision of "planning to cheat", not cheating itself.