Well, all the people who published works before 1710 had no copyrights. All the people who published after that, but not in England had no copyrights until various countries slowly adopted copyright (the US picked it up in 1790, the French after that, and most of Europe in the 19th century -- and they only exported it to the rest of the world by means of colonialism, not on its own actual merits).

Plus there were various limits, e.g. the US only granted copyrights to Americans until almost the end of the 19th century; British authors had no option to get an American copyright at all... unless they became American citizens.

More recently, various classes of work were ineligible. For example, architectural works (in practice, buildings) were uncopyrightable in the US until 1990. Were no buildings designed and built in this country until architects were given copyrights?

What I think you're missing here is that there are a plethora of incentives for an author to create and publish a work. Money gained by exploiting a copyright on the work is but one of those incentives, and often is not the most important one, and also often is not an essential one.

I certainly agree that it can be useful, but that doesn't mean that we ought to go hog wild with it; as with many other things, a little might be beneficial, but too much can be harmful.

The point is to grant authors copyrights as an additional incentive in order to entice them into creating and publishing works which they would not have created and published, but for copyright. If they would've done it anyway, the copyright is superfluous, and granting it would be wasteful. If they require more copyright than is healthy for society, all things considered, we're literally better off not granting it even though it means we'll be bereft of the work in question.

It's not intended to give authors control over works for their own sake. That's just the means by which it functions. It's intended to produce a public benefit. And while the public does benefit from having works created and published, it also benefits from not having anyone controlling works.

Well, that's how it operated in the US from 1790 through to the end of 1977. Turns out that relatively few published works were copyrighted. Further, since there was a renewal term (that is, the copyright would be good for an additional number of years if you re-upped in a timely fashion) we also know that most authors of copyrighted works didn't bother to get a renewal, and let their works enter the public domain sooner than they had to.

It worked fine. We got great literature and the golden age of Hollywood on both film and tv, as well as tons of great music.

And frankly, a system of strict formalities to get copyrights is a more important thing to change in the law than shortening the term length.

Why should the rest of us aid them in doing so? E.g. by conferring upon them some sort of legal rights that pertain to how the work is used by others.

While I think it could potentially be beneficial for the public to grant rights to authors, it's surely not always beneficial under every circumstance, and every permutation of works and rights.

And if the author doesn't like the terms under which the public might deign to give them rights, they're free to not create the work.

It's really a matter of directing its creation. Mere ideas aren't copyrightable, and merely coming up with one doesn't matter. If you use someone else's idea but are the only creative participant, they won't get rights in tor work.

And if you direct creation, you don't have to be the person who literally brings it about, either. But this is more than just paying someone a commission, or giving them the basic idea. It means that the other active participant isn't contributing anything creative.

So for example, if you tell a photographer that you want a photo of some subject, the photographer will end up being the author. If you tell him exactly what camera settings to use, what lighting, choose the subject, pose the subject, etc., then you're engaging in authorship.

No, they're not. Being the author means having sole artistic control. Being a joint author would involve two parties having artistic control, and an intent to produce a joint work. And a work for hire, in which authorship is attributed to an employer requires more than merely commissioning a work. It requires actual employment, with all the relevant indicia (tax forms, insurance, providing the tools and work area, etc.) or in a handful of cases, contractual language.

You might be interested in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony and Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.

I think you mean Johnny Depp.

Nope!

ReDigi was a company that claimed to sell used music files, just as a used bookstore sells books. It argued that it was protected under the 17 USC 109, the first sale exception, by claiming that copying then deleting files was a transfer. (Even they were not so stupid as to believe that it's possible to transfer a file over a network without copying in the process, even if this is not apparent to the user)

The court that heard the case shut them down:

You should read the whole thing: http://www.documentcloud.org/d...

It even points out, as I have, that this is unavoidable:

It is in the US.

What does that have to do with anything? You think that legislators are never wrong?

Here are the laws that make unauthorized downloading of copyrighted works prima facie illegal in the US:

17 USC 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 ... is an infringer of the copyright ... of the author."

17 USC 106: "Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights ... to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies."

17 USC 101: "'Copies' are material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'copies' includes the material object ... in which the work is first fixed."

"A 'device', 'machine', or 'process' is one now known or later developed."

"A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission."

If Alice has a file server on which are copyrighted works, and Bob, without permission from the copyright holder, downloads them, Bob causes his computer to fix those works in a tangible medium of expression (such as a hard drive), which creates new copies of those works. The copy is the tangible medium, again e.g. a hard drive, not the mere intangible files. By creating copies without permission, Bob has infringed on the exclusive right of the copyright holder to make new copies.

So, it's prima facie infringing.

You actually conceded this point earlier; you obliquely referred to 17 USC 117, which is an exception dealing with computer programs. Section 117 is completely unnecessary if no prima facie infringement occurs. Much in the way that you don't have to bother raising a defense to a charge of murder, like self-defense, if the supposed victim is still alive. Or if programming is more your thing, think of an if-then-else statement: if infringement occurs, then see if section 117 applies, else infringement has not occurred, so exit.

So you appear to agree that downloading is prima facie infringement, the question is simply whether the exception in 117 saves the downloader. It almost never will.

17 USC 117: "(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.

(b) Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner."

17 USC 101: "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."

This usually won't work because Bob, the downloader, almost certainly 1) isn't the owner of a copy prior to making a new copy, which is necessary in 117 to be allowed to make the new copy; 2) isn't making copies for archival purposes only; 3) most data, such as music, movies, etc. will not be treated as computer programs by courts, despite the broad language in section 101.

I mean, feel free to try it, but you have my guarantee that you'll not just lose, but be laughed at.

Okay genius, I've cited the relevant statutes for making my argument. It's time for you to put up or shut up.

Remember to cite very specifically, and to look at definitions. You may also want to look at relevant caselaw.

Digital files are just intangible information; what we'd call a work. A book, as a material object in which a work can be fixed, is no different than a hard drive. And btw, most, if not all written languages are digitial. There's no letter that's halfway in between an A and a B.

Not really.

The only significant special treatment of computer programs in the Act that might be useful here is the exception at 17 USC 117. The Act defines "computer programs" as a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result. I think it would be quite a stretch to apply that to absolutely any sort of data on a computer, as opposed to actual executables and such.

But even if we accepted that, it still isn't helpful. 117 allows the owner of a copy to make additional copies or adaptations, only if they're essential for using them, or as backups. And the backups cannot be transferred without transferring the ownership of the original, and cannot be kept in the event of a transfer.

So I don't see how it would help protect you if you decided to host mp3 files for people to download, in an infringing manner. Perhaps you'd like to explain your plan?

Well, I suppose that it's possible that you might unplug your hard drive, put it in a cardboard box, and mail it to me, in response to a download request, but that's surely too unusual to care about.

Because the law defines making copies as a form of infringement, defines copies as material objects, and because we lack the ability to send a material object through the net, you cannot transmit an original copy of a work to me online. All you can do is give me the information I need to create a new copy on my end.

It's irrelevant whether you delete the file once I've downloaded it. The Copyright Act doesn't treat a copy followed by a deletion as not being copying. It doesn't matter in the least how many copies actually exist in the end, only what the provenance of the copies is. There is an essay called 'What colour are your bits?' which you may find helpful.

It is not, in any legally meaningful way, transferred anywhere.

Please take a look at this page, which discusses the outcome of the ReDigi case, and includes a copy of the opinion. ReDigi tried to sell used music files, going through the sort of copy and delete rigamarole as you suggest. They got shut down hard because it's utter nonsense as far as the legal system is concerned.

Thanks for agreeing with me, then; it's not possible to argue fair use unless there already is prima facie infringement.

No.

Creating a new copy of a work can infringe per 17 USC 106(1). But playing a work over a speaker doesn't create a new, infringing copy. That's why we have 17 USC 106(4), which can cause the public performance of certain works to be infringing. With public performance, no new copy needs to be created. Of course, not all performances are public performances -- playing a CD at home, privately, is likely not public and thus not infringing to begin with. Playing it outside, in a public park, is public and very well could be infringing.

I really think you'd benefit a lot by actually looking at the law, or perhaps reading a good book about it, instead of just continuing with what you imagine the law to be.

Given that the word 'copy' in copyright law is defined as a material object, and given the physical impossibility of sending material objects through telecommunications systems, I'm afraid you're very, very wrong.

I can't hold a file in my hand. It's not a material object. But I can hold the storage medium it's written to in my hand; that is a material object. Fixing the work into a new material object from which it can be perceived for a period of more than transitory duration is basically the definition of copying in the law, and as an exclusive right, copying can be infringing.

Feel free to read the relevant portions, at 17 USC 101. You'll want the definition of copies and also of fixing a work. Copying as an exclusive right is at 17 USC 106(1), as already mentioned.

Not all viewers, but a hell of a lot of them.

Here's an excerpt from Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999):

No. Just because it's commonplace doesn't mean that the Internet is intended to enable infringements. The Sony precedent and the DMCA safeharbor both work to protect the continued existence of the Internet, despite widescale infringement. Remember, the basic rule of Sony is this: "[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."

But just because ISPs are not obligated to dismantle the Internet doesn't help individual infringers.

If your analogy using the mail were accurate, it would be possible for me to download a blender from Amazon and have it emerge from the side of my computer. Not a 3d printed blender either; that's just a copy. I mean one that was built at a factory in China or something.

You have RAM, which is a material object. You have a hard drive, which is a material object. You have flash memory, which is a material object. A work written to those makes them copies, just as a work written to a paper book makes it a copy.

In that case, you not buying it because you don't like it equally negatively affects that celebrity, because whatever the reason you don't buy it, they don't get more money.

Now, since then there has been the Cablevision case, where the 2d Circuit said that a work that was momentarily buffered in RAM (in that case, by a network provider) was not a copy because it lasted for too short a duration. But this is not likely to have much effect for the end user.

Also, your example is wrong. Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense, so the mental state (e.g. intent, knowledge) of the infringer is irrelevant.

A better example would be statutory rape, another strict liability offense. If you have sex with someone who swears they're an adult, who can produce excellent documentary support of that claim, and where you literally could not have undertaken any further reasonable measures to ensure that that person wasn't a minor, but it turns out that they were a minor anyway, you've just committed the crime of statutory rape. It doesn't matter how careful you were, that you didn't intend to have sex with a minor, what you knew, etc. Copyright is the same sort of thing.

A&M Records v. Napster., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).