Integrated audio is a bit of a running joke, see Goat Simulator system requirements...

But that's a design patent which just protects the cosmetic look of the product, which is perfectly legitimate for designer alloy wheels.

It's more like the Sikorsky X2. The dual rotors are an important feature; With a single rotor as you increase forward speed you lose lift on one side of the rotor as it slower relative airspeed, until it's basically going backwards. Having contra-rotating rotors means that one side will always have blades going "forwards" regardless of airspeed.

Is it really a single board computer, if the SoC is on a separate board?

Looks more like a mini, more powerful version of the Raspberry Pi Compute Module with a Raspberry Pi like breakout board.

Those SoC modules themselves could be useful on their own if they sell the sockets to use on custom circuit boards...

Hmm, good point, didn't think of messing around with filenames in a for loop.

* could still use ./ as an escape code just for files beginning with - , that seems to me to be more of a step forward than a step back

... is there an example you can point to?

On the other hand this specific issue could be easily solved by * prefixing all filenames with ./

So far I've not heard of anything that would break, and it's silly arguing that this specific problem is part of required functionality and not something that can/should be fixed when it appears to have such a simple solution.

But it could very easily make them explicit filenames by prefixing them with ./, and I can't think of anything that would break.

And what happens if the malicious filename is first in the list?

Because you can trick a more privileged user into executing commands for you by writing files into your own folder. Most the examples given were of admin housekeeping tasks run against a user writeable folder.

If computers were conceived to execute user commands, then why is a command for matching file and dictionary names returning them in such a form that they become executable parameters, when they could easily be explicit filenames by adding ./ at the beginning?

Is making what should be basic and safe housekeeping functions like chmod * and tar * dangerous really something you actually want in Linux?

How about adding ./ to the beginning of each filename output by *? Is there a single thing that would break by doing that?

The examples given are potential admin tasks doing filesystem maintenance on a user's folder.

Right, so an admin tarballing the content of a user's folder is an idiot because he didn't check to make sure the shell he was using wouldn't pass any of the file names as executable attributes instead of, you know, file names?

The definition of the unix wildcard when used in the shell is:

"The character * is a wildcard and matches zero or more character(s) in a file (or directory) name."

Note that the definition doesn't include anything about translate filenames into other kinds of executable parameters.

Who asked for this feature? Can anyone give me a legitimate use case for "tar cf archive.tar *" evaluating as

tar cf archive.tar admin.php ado.php --checkpoint=1 "--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell.sh"

instead of

tar cf archive.tar "./admin.php" "./ado.php" "./--checkpoint=1" "./--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell.sh"