Read the cockpit transcript. The stall warnings stopped whenever the crew member pulled the stick back and made the stall worse. (They stopped because the computer was programmed to treat the ridiculously low airspeed indications as instrument failures and disregard them).

It has 2 pitot tubes and 1 failed.

On 12 August 2009, Airbus issued three Mandatory Service Bulletins, requiring that all A330 and A340 aircraft be fitted with two Goodrich 0851HL pitot tubes and one Thales model C16195BA pitot (or alternatively three of the Goodrich pitots)

Apart from that the aircraft was in perfect condition. The failing pitot tube recovered during the fall, so all equipment worked correctly.

The autopilot shut off and the computer put the plane into alternate law, where pilots are allowed to do stupid things like stall the plane. The computer had one perfectly working airspeed indicator to rely on, but instead it panicked.

Happy Holidays offends _me_ only because it is so damn generic and politically correct.

So I think I will just go with "Have a merry Santa Claus Day and a happy new year" (Unless we don't want to offend people following other calender new years.)

If that stall warning had kept working, AF447 would likely not have crashed.

If the autopilot had not panicked and disabled the normal computer control because of a single faulty sensor, AF447 would likely not have crashed.

If the plane had synchronized sticks, the other pilot would likely have taken control and AF447 would likely not have crashed.

NARRATOR: As they [simulator pilots] edge around the storm, Alder triggers the critical moment of Flight 447: he fails all three airspeed indicators.

SIMULATOR CO-PILOT: Okay, we have NAV ADR 1 fault. We have unreliable airspeed.

NARRATOR: The automatic flight control systems shut down.

SIMULATOR CO-PILOT: We're flying with no auto-pilot or auto-thrust.

SIMULATOR CAPTAIN: Okay. Autopilot's off. I have control.

SIMULATOR CO-PILOT: You have control.

NARRATOR: If their actual airspeed rises or falls by as little as 10 knots, they could suffer a catastrophic loss of control. But the pilot uses standard procedures, learned in training. He moves the throttle levers to set thrust at exactly 85 percent.

SIMULATOR CAPTAIN: And I'm selecting...I've got 85 percent set.

NARRATOR: Then, he raises the elevators to pitch the nose up at precisely five degrees. With engines at 85 percent power, and five degrees upward pitch, the aircraft should always settle at the same safe speed.

JOHN COX: The thrust levers themselves, the throttles, don't move. Unlike some other airplanes, where you can feel the throttle in your hand moving, with Airbus aircraft, that throttle doesn't move with auto-thrust engaged, so you have to look at specific engine power indications.

NARRATOR: The power indication is displayed here, on the central control panel. But if auto-thrust switches off while the engines are in low power, the crew might lose track of the low thrust level.

JOHN COX: If you're very task-saturated, your concentration's going to be directly in front of you. What's the power output of the engines? You're going to have to physically turn your attention and look to the center console area..

This is not going to be done as frequently as looking at, at the things right in front of you. It, it's certainly going to be in the scan; the question is, "How often?".

NARRATOR: The aircraft is now nearer the lower end of its safe speed range. But overloaded by fault warnings, the crew might not realize they need to increase power..

That's not how I understand it, based on the translation of the cockpit recording. The captain was allowed to take a break whenever he wanted and unfortunately he chose the time right before the plane entered a storm that led to the air speed tubes freezing over. I wouldn't call it "scheduled" as that sort of implies something like "At exactly 3 hours into the flight the captain will take a break" when the timing of the break was up to him.

In fact, many were shocked at how early he took his break as usually the captain takes a break much later in the flight. But they didn't know for a while that he was apparently flying on only 1 hour of sleep as he had sleeping problems in his hotel, so that must have made him want to take his break early.

The cockpit recording seems to indicate the senior co-pilot not helping as much as you might think. He did help some, but it seemed clear that he kept deferring in judgement to the guy flying the plane, which was a fatal mistake in hindsight.

Some aviation experts are speculating that the rapid expansion of budget airlines in Asia has led to training shortages and if this ends up being a similar accident to AF447 where an improperly trained pilot inadvertently puts the plane into a stall, all I can say is that this wasn't supposed to happen again. After AF447 the airlines were supposed to train specifically to prevent that kind of thing from happening again

It's interesting... most of the expert opinions I have heard say that the asynchronous nature of Airbus sidesticks was *not* to blame, and that the crash would not have happened if the pilots were properly communicating as per Cockpit Resource Management protocol.

However, when you consider that the crash happened basically because a very junior pilot was pulling the stick back *the entire time* and the senior pilot did not realize this,

Obviously, since those two terms are exactly the same, but this did not circumvent DRM. Perhaps you need to explain what you think that term means because all of the digital rights management was preserved, not circumvented.

Digital Rights Management (DRM) is a class of technologies that are used by hardware manufacturers, publishers, copyright holders, and individuals with the intent to control the use of digital content and devices after sale; there are, however, many competing definitions. With first-generation DRM software, the intent is to control copying; with second-generation DRM, the intent is to control executing, viewing, copying, printing, and altering of works or devices. The term is also sometimes referred to as copy protection, copy prevention, and copy control, although the correctness of apply DRM is in dispute.

Oh right yes and if you dont like Microsoft having proprietary APIs in Windows you should just build your own operating system. It is the same anti-competitive behavior and the same dirty tactics, but they may be able to get away with it if they can prove they didnt have market power.

It makes perfect sense to any person but an Apple apologist! The formats were fine, it was Apple's DRM layer that was the problem. Real allowed users to play music and maintained the DRM required by the publishers, Apple just didn't like that there was another competitor.

Wrong, there is no "standard" but Apple controlled the digital music market with iTunes+iPod so whatever they used was the defacto standard and they prevented any other companies from inter-operating. This is anti-competitive.

Teeth or Beaks are binary in nature, we don't see any creatures with both. Your rant about binary nature is flawed, because while nature isn't binary, sometimes the results are.