Comment Re:Mincraft is for cows. (Score 1) 56
Iron Sky http://www.imdb.com/title/tt10...
Iron Sky http://www.imdb.com/title/tt10...
You are right. There's no reason for why you can't 'spin down' a rack of cheap server grade HDs to save power.
What happened to Bernoulli disks anyway?
They resize them first, then compress. A 3~5mb pic is stored around 10% of the uploaded size.
MOOOOOOO! MOOOOOOO!
So let's teach WWII by playing Wolfenstein.
OTOH If it was a pic of a gorilla but labelled 'Black Afro-American' then you would have the same issue.
eth0 being renamed to biosdevname and then 'consistent' device naming happened outside of systemd per se. It's one of the various questionable things that came along at about the same time as systemd, and systemd gets the blame for *all* of them, when it only brought some of it. E.g. complaining about binary logs, you can aim that square at systemd. Most of the other prominent rants commonly fired at systemd are either dbus, networkmanager, udev, or something else in reality.
The network device naming is one facet where they can't win. The ethX has problems, and so does the current state of consistent device naming (notably that if an adapter veers off into being enumerated by pci, it's probably a lost cause in all but the most extremely homogenous environment and doing those names is just causing more trouble than helping)
I agree that Torvalds isn't the authoritative god of all that makes up a distribution and as such his opinion is one to be considered, but no the only one.
Also he speaks to the biggest fundamental controversy, the log strategy/format. I agree with Torvalds, that the capabilities of systemd are interesting, but I personally find the bathwater that comes with it troublesome enough to not want it. That and how they engage with the community at times. A lot of the other gripes about systemd are more implementation mistakes that are unintended and often addresed, but this part is very explicitly intentional and counter arguments have been dismissed out of hand.
Sometimes you don't have a choice in an interoperable piece of software. In an aggresive world that tosses away backwards compat in the name of security, you'd either have to toss out a bunch of perfectly ok equipment because you *can't* talk to it anymore, or stick to outdated software to protect the investment, which may have unfixed vulnerabilities because the versions that fix things also dropped support for your needs.
All the known broken facets of MD5 have zero applicability to HMAC usage scenario. The only part of it that weakens HMAC is that SHA256/SHA512 are more computationally expensive.
If someone knows a weakness in HMAC-MD5, it's hard to imagine it would be related to any of the known broken parts of MD5, and thus HMAC-MD5's chances of being broken might not be so different than any other HMAC use of a hash.
Yes HMAC-SHA2 is the best choice now. Now it's not a good reason to go nuts over things that use HMAC-MD5 today.
This organization would just be responsible for verifying that software is secure
That was my assumption going in. I'm saying that 'verifying that software is secure' is a complex beast that I don't think is such a trivial undertaking. I was thinking of a company that has a 'development' team and a 'security' team, which I have experience in. The security team generally devolves into effectively black box testing of a system without understanding the real purpose and potentially fishy stuff going on internally that will pave the way to future vulnerabilites. CyberUL would be in those shoes, doing largely black box testing because there is no way they could do full code audits. Sure they can probe it or demand source code to do some analysis tools on it, but the most notorious security problems have mostly been around new discoveries about widely deployed technology that had previously *eluded* such analysis that is already prevalent in the industry.
It may be good to have a CyberUL to formalize already known best practices, but I don't think it's going to get what people want out of it.
Support for limited subset of encryption protocols is also a benefit of its own. E.g. OpenSSL still supports MD5
Which is quite important, since there are a *lot* of scenarios that still use MD5 (and HMAC-MD5 isn't even broken). So for things that need MD5 hashes even if it's not secure, you can still function, and for things that still use HMAC-MD5, you can still talk *securely*.
HA! I'm running Lindows
I thought all those with ID >101 have ascended or have had their consciousness uploaded into some kind of silicon based brain!
Thanks for being here for us, guiding the way.
Yeah. If your ISP's DNS server is in a country that is monitoring requests, then:
A: Your ISP can see what you are viewing
B: They would be bound by law to hand over the logs.
By going out of the geopolitical boundary (that's if you can) for DNS, then it's 1 chink in your armour.
Well one, it's bad enough for a single company to have their 'security' teams meaningfully assess the security beyond the obvious. Good security really has to be ingrained throughout the process.
The obvious security issues that something like a 'CyberUL' would catch are generally not the issues. The problem is that once a new issue is discovered, the existing install base is not be updated. Either because updates are available but IT teams are slack, or because everyone has jumped on the bandwagon of using preloaded stuff baked into products that get subsequently abandoned by their vendor or the vendor just goes defunct.
For another, any US endorsed entity calling the shots for security faces a bad credibility problem. NIST is pretty well distrusted globally now, I don't know what would happen with this initiative.
Understanding is always the understanding of a smaller problem in relation to a bigger problem. -- P.D. Ouspensky