Comment Re:Good luck with that. (Score 5, Interesting) 558
Actually, post Chip+Pin (and RFID interact flash for that matter) this sort of attack isn't possible. That's because the chip inside the card creates a unique one time approval for the transaction. The approval is un-replayable,
At worst, attack wise, you might be able to perform a turnstile attack on it (Interac flash reader, taped to a turnstile say), but transactions over Interac flash are capped at under 100$ and every 5 transactions you have to re-auth with a full chip and pin, so the banks' risk is pretty limited there.
Disclaimer: I've not done an indepth analysis of the security controls myself. I know there were some weaknesses in the Euro implementation around not signing the list of allowable transaction verification mechanisms or somesuch (look up the blackhat talk if you need to know) but it's a LOT more difficult these days then inserting a skimmer on the terminal and video recording the pin. (Interac was always two factor, until interac flash).
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