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Comment Added value (Score 1) 81

try to imagine the internet without any reliable search engines and no paywalls. In this model all the information is free and out there and is either completely unusable or impossible to locate and no chance of a concensus on what information is the highest value.

If there is no added value why do people pay then? They could put their work up on Xarchiv or just post it on their own web site or submit it to many other journals. When it comes to other journals the model is either author pays or reader pays. Elsevier is reader pays. so called open content journals are author pays. There's even hybrid journals where if the author doesn't pay the reader must. For most journals there usually is also a page charge to the author no matter what.

Yet this people willingly submit their work to journals of both stripes.

The cost is what prevents a tragedy of the commons. Journals who have good names are desirable to be published in and also desirable to peer review for. This becomes a virtuous circle and tends in the long run to promote the best work worth my time to read. That's what I want. there's too much to read. I want some filter on the process. Some level of curation.

When publishing houses can enforce that with either model then cost of that is negligible compared to the resulting value.

Comment paywalls are not selling out. (Score -1, Troll) 81

Why is a paywall bad? I think it is a good thing for companies to provide services of value and get rewarded for it. I'm sad to see traditional publishers who pay for reporters and columnists be undermined by aggregators that leach content and don't do much. The problem is that google news drives what traffic these sites still get and they limp on that and the ad revenues it brings in, but the aggregators profit hansomely without incurring the costs of creating the content.

I'm happy to see that the Wall street journal bucked this trend and managed to find customers for it's pay wall and I'm sad the Ny times isn't succeeding as well.

I don't begrudge people their paywalls.

It's a long distance from things like internet.org and the alternative walled gardens of the internet with unreachable content that breaks the internet.

Comment manure pit (Score 3, Interesting) 591

Death by nitrogen is the ideal way to die. It's so effective it's one of the dangers in nitrogen inerted buildings. You don't know you are dieing you just pass out. SOmeone comes along sees you down in the room and tries to rescue you and bang they keel over too. It's the classic farmer manure pit death.

the key here is that your urgent need to breath oddly enough is not triggered by lack of oxygen but by build up of CO2. when you remove the O2 from your air then you don't notice it because your alarm system isn't triggered. You are still getting rid of the CO2 in your blood.

Why nature rigged it like that I have no idea but it is easy to see that under almost any normal condition the two are linked making having separate sensors of O2 and CO2 not needed so why evolve one.

Comment Re:I'd Like To See Electronic Voting Work (Score 1) 105

From the wiki article you cite:
Broken Encryption

The encryption system used in the three ballot was broken by a correlation attack devised by Charlie Strauss[5] who also showed how it could be used to prove how you voted [6]. Strauss's attack relied on the fact that not all receipt strips can pair with all cast strip pairs since proposed triplets with 3 or 1 vote cast in any race on the ballot (not just one race of interest) can be rejected since the strips could not be from the same ballot. Since there are far more vote patterns on a typical United States precinct ballot than there are ballots cast in a precinct, statistically nearly all of the ballot pairs cast can only be paired uniquely with one receipt strip kept by the voter. This allows a the voters votes to be known by anyone with the receipt. Furthermore a voter conspiring to prove their vote (for money, coercion, or posterity) could mark all the strips in a unique previously agreed pattern that would assure recovery. Rivest et all, acknowledged this logic error in their concept[1], and revised the schema to require tearing off each race individually (destroying the correlation of the races) and having theoretically traceable tracking numbers on each race-level receipt. While this did restore the unbreakable aspect of the scheme, arguably the proliferation of receipts and chopped ballots rendered the mechanics of processing the votes or for a voter reviewing a receipt significantly complex, thus defeating its intended simplicity.

Comment now you have two problems. (Score 2) 105

If any electronic voting system is going to work, it would be a system that prints what you've voted so the voter can see what he/she voted. And then you have a separate electronic counting of those pieces of paper.

Now I know in the past they had some what similar systems in the US and they had problems with printers not working, so I don't know if they'll ever get it right.

There are also a whole lot of people who use terms like math/encryption or blockchain.

So far I haven't seen a system that works.

It does however make for interesting presentations:
http://media.ccc.de/browse/con...

Good lord, that did not make the problem better, you just have all the problems of both and none of the advantages.

And a photo of any such paper would allow you to prove how you voted which is antithetical to the secret ballot. Conversely a photo of a marked paper ballot is not proof of how you voted since it's not counted until it is invisible in the ballot box or optical scan. The voting machine makers tried to do something like that with a rolled continuous paper ballot printer the voter could see. However these tape ballots which were longer than a football field proved impossible to manipulate for recounting. With cut sheets it's easy to divide them into piles for any race and then have the observers help you recount the piles. takes very little time to sort and recount fixed page paper ballots for any given race being recounted. Not so with the toilet paper rolls. Furthermore, paper jams and printer malfunctions made these unreliable. paper ballots don't have that problem and if the opscan jams they can be counted later after putting them in a locked ballot box.

finally when a machine does go down or a church bus shows up to vote all at once, long lines ensue. When pen breaks on a paper ballot you get more pens, and you can have as many voting stations as you like.

Finally, which record is the actual record in case of a discrepancy? the electronic one or the paper one? ideally you want one tracable to the voters makrking action not her click-through glance at a printed paper ballot. With DRE's the errors happen during the clumsy touch screen process. (e.g. if you can't make a fist with one finger extended (people with R. Arthtrhitis can't) then you can't use a touch screen accurately. the touchscreens get out of calibration and programming errors result in incorrect recording of votes. pens on paper are generally more accessible (even though DREs can offer some handicap accessible features) and record the voters intent directly.

p>That way you have faster counting of votes and still everything on paper as back up.

faster? no slower. precint counting is not the slow part. the optical scans of paper count instantly. the rate limits are how may voters can vote at the same time (paper ballots win) and the protocols for collation to central tabulation of the precints (for which there's not any difference between opscan and a DRE voting machines).

Comment chain of evidence (Score 4, Insightful) 144

These two were tied up in the chain of evidence that led to his conviction, so depending on what gets tossed he has a chance here. Now he did admit that at one time he was DPR and that he had resumed work under the alias so he's probably not going to get everything overturned. But his defense was that someone else associated possibly with MTGOX was the mastermind framing him more recently.

So what's intriguing here is that one of the investigators was doing some shenanigams with MTGOX accounts and was involved in seizing MTGOX assets. Since MT GOX started having liquidity problems right during this investigation of Silk road, it really makes you wonder if this is where some of those missing assets went.

Furthermore the agents appear to have done things as their shenanigans came to light to obfuscate the trail back to them. This is not too far afield from ulricht's claim that someone was framing him, asking him to step in as DPR, and putting keys on his computer.

It actually seems it's not far fetched to imagine Ulricht was telling the truth about having relinquished DPR that someone suddenly invited him back into the game as the FBI closed in. Perhaps there's some grains of truth in there somewhere. e.g. maybe one of the agents did add his bitcoin keys to Urichts computers.

Given those sorts of conjectures it seems very reasonable he should get a new trial. He's guilty by his own admission, but maybe not guilty of everything he's charged with.

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