Comment Re:Grand opening! (Score 5, Informative) 97
Let's Encrypt, a division of Shell Company, LLC., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Totally Not The NSA, Inc.
You seem to misunderstand the purpose and nature of these certificates. While it is fun as a joke, that isn't what it is for.
These certificates never have been meant to protect against either government agencies or against employers. It has always been known by security geeks that any intermediate actor in the chain can eavesdrop and can intercept the connection. That is not what they protect against. They protect by revealing the links in the chain.
SSL is intentionally vulnerable for those implementing a MitM attack, and many businesses and schools implement this. Quite a few major networking products have simplified MitM down to the point of simply hitting a checkbox. One of the biggest corporate reasons for this is to enable caching.
SSL is absolutely vulnerable to being (eventually) deciphered by anyone who eavesdrops, and is vulnerable to being modified by any person holding a matching cert for any point on the certificate's security chain. There are many accounts that major governments already have copies of those critical points.
So what does it offer? The most immediate benefits are replay prevention and an integrity guarantee. Imagine if an attacker recorded a session of you logging into your bank and transferring funds. Without replay protection, and with no other replay protections by the bank, an attacker could replay the transaction over and over and over again, draining your bank account. Since both client and server theoretically offer unique session keys for each session they cannot be replayed. The integrity guarantee is also important, meaning that once your connection is established, those monitoring your connection cannot modify it without it being detected. The integrity guarantee is fairly weak and easily subject to MitM exploits unless properly configured with EV certificates or using two-way TLS and requiring mutual authentication. Basically you can detect all the links in the chain, but if one of those links is already compromised that isn't the protocol's fault. If someone inside your trust chain is intercepting and re-encoding your messages, the protocol won't stop it; all it will show is the person is a link in the authentication chain.
It also offers moderate degree of protection for authentication that the host you are connecting to matches who they claim to be; that is, with a TLS or SSL connection to example.com, if you know the certificate, then you have an authentication chain that the site matches. Just like the integrity guarantee, the protocol shows you all the links and nothing more. You still need to watch out for weak links. If one of the links in the certificate chain includes your corporate proxy or school's servers then you should assume that link in the chain is compromised, which is the most common MitM attack.
The protection most people think of -- the protection from eavesdropping -- is only a very weak protection and not guaranteed by the protocol. The encryption adds a cost to any eavesdroppers not part of the security chain, but for most of the encryption protocols that protection is minimally overcome with a large budget.