If any electronic voting system is going to work, it would be a system that prints what you've voted so the voter can see what he/she voted. And then you have a separate electronic counting of those pieces of paper.
Now I know in the past they had some what similar systems in the US and they had problems with printers not working, so I don't know if they'll ever get it right.
There are also a whole lot of people who use terms like math/encryption or blockchain.
So far I haven't seen a system that works.
It does however make for interesting presentations:
http://media.ccc.de/browse/con...
Good lord, that did not make the problem better, you just have all the problems of both and none of the advantages.
And a photo of any such paper would allow you to prove how you voted which is antithetical to the secret ballot. Conversely a photo of a marked paper ballot is not proof of how you voted since it's not counted until it is invisible in the ballot box or optical scan. The voting machine makers tried to do something like that with a rolled continuous paper ballot printer the voter could see. However these tape ballots which were longer than a football field proved impossible to manipulate for recounting. With cut sheets it's easy to divide them into piles for any race and then have the observers help you recount the piles. takes very little time to sort and recount fixed page paper ballots for any given race being recounted. Not so with the toilet paper rolls. Furthermore, paper jams and printer malfunctions made these unreliable. paper ballots don't have that problem and if the opscan jams they can be counted later after putting them in a locked ballot box.
finally when a machine does go down or a church bus shows up to vote all at once, long lines ensue. When pen breaks on a paper ballot you get more pens, and you can have as many voting stations as you like.
Finally, which record is the actual record in case of a discrepancy? the electronic one or the paper one? ideally you want one tracable to the voters makrking action not her click-through glance at a printed paper ballot. With DRE's the errors happen during the clumsy touch screen process. (e.g. if you can't make a fist with one finger extended (people with R. Arthtrhitis can't) then you can't use a touch screen accurately. the touchscreens get out of calibration and programming errors result in incorrect recording of votes. pens on paper are generally more accessible (even though DREs can offer some handicap accessible features) and record the voters intent directly.
p>That way you have faster counting of votes and still everything on paper as back up.
faster? no slower. precint counting is not the slow part. the optical scans of paper count instantly. the rate limits are how may voters can vote at the same time (paper ballots win) and the protocols for collation to central tabulation of the precints (for which there's not any difference between opscan and a DRE voting machines).