When people chat loudly on a phone while on public transport, I like to comment on their conversation when they hang up.
Me: It sounds like Susan is a real drama queen. You should tell her to stop being so dramatic.
Phone person: What, were you listening in to my private conversation?
Me: Oh I'm sorry, I didn't realise it was private. I thought you wanted to involve everyone else on the train in your mindless pap.
Phone person: !!?!?
I don't mind people talking on phones when they need to. e.g. I'll be at the station in 20 mins, can you come pick me up? But why have full detailed conversations while on a packed bus/train?
Does it record to two files if the shows overlap (due to begin/end padding)?
Yes. You can create up to five virtual tuners per tuner card, which will solve this problem.
I hope you are joking... right? That's the 'sollution'? And then people wonder why I rant that it's a configuration hell?
The virtual tuners are brilliant. You can use a single tuner card to record multiple channels off the one Digital stream. That means if you have 2 virtual tuners set up on your one physical tuner card you can record two shows one after the other with the padding you have set for each show. And if the station is broadcasting multicast stations, you can record two of those multicast stations at the same time.
This is exactly what you are asking for. There are plenty of howto's on setting up the virtual tuners.
I've run Windows MCE XP, Vista, Win7 and MythTV. It took me all of about an hour to set up MythTV the way I wanted (yes, with virtual tuners too) following the howto's. Sure I've played with linux desktops before, but I wouldn't call myself an expert by any means.
MythTV has issues (which is why I'm using Win7 now, it is really nice but I miss some of the MythTV features) but it is a work in progress. It does some things much better than the alternatives and some things worse.
If you've had so much trouble with virtual tuners, perhaps you should stay away from MythTV until version 1.0.
That's only because the previous Australian Federal Government stupidly decided to sell off the whole of Telstra. It really should have been split into wholesale and retail, wholesale remaining government owned. Once it was sold off, the infrastructure was sold off with it. Telstra has always been difficult to deal with, completely privatising it just made it near impossible.
The Australian National Broadband Network will finally rectify decades of poor telecommunications and infrastructure policy by successive Federal Governments.
Have you ever worked in a secure IT environment? Actually, have you ever worked in IT?
Unless your first computer came as a pinout diagram for a 4-bit processor, a soldering iron and an idea, I've been doing it longer than you have.
Nice. I wasn't trying to pay you out or anything, it's just that the
There was nobody in the entire city that he was willing to give the passwords to, which makes him a dick (and now a felon) not a conscientious employee.
Agreed. However clear written policies may have helped the situation. Then again, there's no guarantee that Childs would have followed those policies.
For what it's worth, I blame his boss and his boss's boss as much as our pet head-case. They needed to have access restoration policies and procedures in place for exactly this situation. What did they plan on doing if he was hit by a bus or dropped dead from Burger-King and Jolt Cola? One guy holds all the keys? That's just stupid.
Definately agreed. I have "hit by a bus" action files for each position in my team, including myself. As I'm sure you know, it's just good risk management. Unfortunately we have had to implement one of those "hit by a bus" action files in the past.
Have you ever worked in a secure IT environment? Actually, have you ever worked in IT?
Good IT security policy has rules and restrictions over who can have access to certain systems. I manage some systems that my boss isn't authorised to access. There are plenty of examples of this and it is completely normal. Basic IT security practice is to only have access to systems you need to access. An example of this is root access for some systems. In order to get root access you need to place a request with IT Security, they enable your root access for a limited time (perhaps an hour or so, depending on what you need the access for). IT Security keep a log of who gained root access when, why, and who authorised it (if additional authorisation is required).
You need clear written rules for password/account hand-over. Places serious about IT security have a dedicated IT Security section. Typically someone there is authorised to receive passwords to pass out to replacements etc. For some systems you may be required to keep a copy of the account details in a sealed envelope within a dual access safe.
If I gave my boss the password to a system he's not authorised to access I would be fired on the spot and taken to court for breaching security protocol. My contract specifically mentions that scenario.
I'm not defending Childs, from what's come out from the trial he was being a dick. However if they didn't have any clear written rules for password hand-over then the higher-ups also should take some blame for this situation.
I'm not in the US, so I can't really talk about US bank security. But there is a difference between customer security and internal security.
I'm dealing with systems that entire banking sectors use to transfer funds between each other. Many billions of dollars passing through these systems daily.
Compare the risk associated with those systems to the risk of a customer losing thousands (even hundreds of thousands) of dollars. Many banks choose to wear the risk of fraud to make customer interaction easier. Not saying it's right or not, but there's always a trade off.
Look at the way some banks (particularly in the US) hand out credit cards. They know that some people aren't going to pay their bills but they calculate (correctly) that the percentage of defaults will be low enough that the overall business will be profitable. They could get tougher with their customer selection criteria so that virtually noone defaults, but they realised they can make more money this way.
Are you actually in charge of a shop now? Doubt it!
Yes. Well, my section within our IT department in an organisation within the Banking industry.
Password security is one of the questions I ask of all potential employees, as should any IT employer.
Funny thing about banks, they kind of take security a bit seriously.
"Ninety percent of baseball is half mental." -- Yogi Berra