I did read other sources. I talk to people who read other sources. Enough to know Airbus hides info from pilots -- critical info such as pitch trim, throttles that don't move as autothrottle adjusts power, and provides no tactile feedback to the stick
So you just admitted that you don't know anything - Boeing aircraft "hide" just as much information, throttles move as a single entity and yet are controlled through auto-throttle as independent entities (this has been linked as a contributory factor in more than one air crash - see the Kegworth air crash report), tactile feedback is a computer amalgamation rather than actuality etc etc.
Airbus isn't a seat-of-the-pants airplane, you almost have to think like a passenger, not a pilot.
Ouch, so you definitely don't know anything about Airbus aircraft then.
Oh well -- that's the conclusion I reached over the years of this accident being known, as well as other Airbus incidents involving their computers.
And all that does is make you come across as another anti-Airbus critic rather than someone actually informed of the topic at hand.
On AF 447 BEA blamed training, cockpit ergonomics and incorrect procedure. They didn't even mention the role FEP had. It seems the French authorities like to shield Airbus from responsibility and scrutiny.
See, anti-Airbus bullshit. The FEP had no role in the situation, the crew should have recovered from the stall without issue. Infact, they should never have got into the stall in the first place, they should have enacted stall avoidance procedures as soon as the autopilot disconnected. But they didn't, their training completely broke down and the entire situation went to pot.
The Airbus flight controls don't' talk to each other. The left seater can't tell what the right seater was doing. One of them pulled the stick back all the way and kept it there. I read somewhere, forgot where, that the other pilot did the opposite at the same time. Sorry, no citation for that one. Go look for it yourself.
Don't need to look, I've seen that crap spouted elsewhere. Have you *ever* sat in an Airbus cockpit? If not, then its easy to just accept the bullshit that neither pilot knows what the other is doing - with both pilots sat in their seat, its trivial to glance at the others side stick and see what position its in. Nothing is blocking it.
Oh, and if one pilot is doing one thing and the other pilot is doing something else, thats a complete breakdown of CRM in the cockpit - the pilot flying has command authority, the other pilot should not be touching the stick. And in any case, the sticks have priority buttons which require pressing before the stick does anything - so its impossible for both sticks to be engaged at the same time, both pilots can be dancing the macaraina on their own stick and it wouldn't matter, only the one with command priority would have any effect.
The crew was confused and even panicked for many minutes. They were passengers in an airplane that was perhaps too smart for it's own good.
And they shouldn't have been - you know how long the actual airspeed mismatch situation occured for during the entire final phase of AF447s flight? The airspeed mismatch which was caused by the iced up pitot tube, and caused the autopilot to disconnect? Less than 3% of the total event time. The rest of it was the crew panicking and not carrying out their basic stall avoidance protection. Immediately when they received the airspeed mismatch warning, they should have angled the nose up slightly and applied a set amount of throttle. They did neither. And that is what killed them, not the aircraft.
1. Did they not see the altimeter unwinding?
They did. They ignored it.
2. Did they not see the artificial horizon showing more blue than black?
They did. They ignored it.
3. Did they not see the variometer showing a high sink rate?
They did. They ignored it.
4. Did the airplane hide / misrepresent reality? Or did the crew just completely ignore what the above instruments were showing?
They ignored the instruments. See the BEA report.
I hate to pull this card, but have you flown? Have you soloed?
8,000 hours in twin engine aircraft. 1,400 on Airbus A320s as FO. 800 on Boeing 737NG as FO.
Have you felt how an airplane shakes as you near a stall? In a small airplane you can even hear how the sound of the whoosh of the air over the wing changes as you approach a stall. The controls get all mushy. Pity, that AF 447's crew couldn't feel the stick go slack on them as they stalled.
You wouldn't get much change in controls on an aircraft as large as either the A320 or the 737, regardless of the approach each manufacturer takes. When you train for a large civil aircraft, you never ever take it to the point of stall, you are always enacting stall avoidance during the approach to stall. Even if you get into a full stall, the controls still feel fine.
All I have is a few hours, a few solos and a few landings in a rope-and-pulley Cessna -- but that gives me a fair idea of how it feels to fly an honest airplane. I can't even imagine how it must feel (not feel?) to hand-fly something as fast and heavy as an airliner *with no stick feedback!*
It feels perfectly fine, the vast majority of your "feel" in aircraft that size comes from other aspects rather than the controls
As for the Paris Lawnmower, I'd like to think an airplane which would've done what the control inputs asked for would've flown out of that mess.
And how would it have done that? Magic? Where was the sudden increase in power going to come from? Does your magical aircraft have engines that instantly spool up on demand? GE, RR and P&W would love to have a chat if so.
AF296 was at its limit when it did that fly by - the aircraft couldn't have pulled up because it was out of energy, the flight systems knew that which was why it was already in alpha floor protection. That aircraft needed power that the pilot should have already commanded 15 seconds prior to the point at which he did - that was why the aircraft crashed, not due to the aircraft going into alpha floor protection mode. The pilot was stupid and other people paid the price.
You keep looking away from the fact that Airbus' FEP has screwed more than a few pilots over.
You think Airbus is innocent, I think their design philosophy is presumptuous.
And accident rates and figures do not agree with you. Simple as that really.
