No, you've got to do better than, "I wouldn't think of doing such a thing" when it comes to 21st century governments.
Alright. What do you propose?
Fundamentally, encrypting all traffic all the time requires a public key infrastructure and the only way we know how to build one that works is to have trusted third parties. You trust your browser, for example. Your browser maker outsources ID verification of websites to CA's.
Ultimately SSL cannot survive being explicitly banned or subverted by the state. It just can't. They can force browser makers to give them a back door. No system can survive explicitly being banned by the state. Luckily this has not (yet) happened - strong SSL is not illegal and there are no documents in Snowden's archive that discuss compromises of CA's, probably because when armed with a bunch of zero days you don't need to exploit a CA to strip SSL, you just infect the target. Much more stealthy.
What's more, Google is pushing certificate transparency forward quite hard. CT is a system that requires certificates to be published to an audit log for a browser to accept them. It should make it much harder for a CA to issue certificates in secret. The audit logs can be data mined to look for bogus certs, e.g. certs that are issued but never show up in production usage, either by big well known targets like Google or by third parties. So far it's the best proposal that exists for how to raise the security of SSL. All others are busts.