No you wouldn't want to jump from a plane with a solid gold parachute (it'd be too heavy). Golden is a different beast alltogether. A golden parachute could be made out of $20m of rarest silk with all the d-rings made from chocolate diamonds and a harness embroydered with hundreds of untraceable swiss bank account numbers.

In one of the Books of the Malazans series there was a town where, should you default on an obligation the holder of that obligation could decide to to make you swim across the local harbor with bearing the amount of your default strapped to your body in gold. It cost the owed party twice the amount (e.g. his cash out of pocket and the money he'd never get from you) but people were very unlikely to default on obligations. Plus the creditor coudl often make his money back on the side bets for how long it took you to drown... Now _that_ woudl be a system for exiting CEOs.

This "represetation of the artists" will be the DRM and studios... I get your point about the public domain, but who is going to represent the _actual_ artists and other creatives?

Stupider than that... grandparent says "GOP aka Republicans"... so not only does he not know what the GOP is, he was unable to read the whole post.

since fail2ban would ban the entire NAT(ed) other office if one actor there were to fail-out from a host in that office, it suffers from the same "short coming" as my script in general, and if you know that some particular shop somewhere is behind a nat, why wouldn't you then white-list that address anyway? e.g. using fail2ban is a good way to let one noob at (remote office) lock out everyone at (remote office). Just because it _hasn't_ happened to you yet doesn't mean that you are ready for the case when it does.

That's a real wizzer of a solution there bob...

If you don't already have white-lists (and preferably VPNs) between known good sites you are just a denial-of-service or "I can't remember my password with this hangover" event away from the theoretical firing anyway.

Again, if you don't know how to apply your tools then all solutions that you don't already think are super-duper will seem suspect. Since you don't seem to know the weaknesses of your current solution, and you improperly apply your "wisdom" as analysis of _my_ solution, you are proved doubly wrong.

Cookbook fail to you, good sir...

(P.S. I know, and point out, that the good and bad attempts are counted in the limit. There are reasons. That those reasons don't apply to your case doesn't make _me_ wrong, it makes _you_ short-sighted for assuming that what doesn't work for your case can't possibly be correct for anyone. 8-)

While I do use this at home, I also use it on a number of forward facing servers for business purposes (usually with different thresholds and numbers). I spend very little time at "my desk" so the ability to know that I will always have a computer with a pre-shared key available is quite limited. If I am, say, at a hangar at an airfield and I get an emergency call to check on a host, I can ssh to my own (unprivileged) account and elevate my privileges thereafter. So I, and my very few alternates, can respond from anywhere with no chance of leaking meaningful key material as one might if they tried to match up known/authorized keys (and USB sticks are verboten in many of the places I find myself).

In that usage pattern, if I ended up having to ssh in more than five times in a single hour then things are really not right. (and if I knew that sort of thing was going to happen I _could_ always tweak the rule, but I more often use the multi-session ControlPath etc options to side-step the 5-per-hour limit if larger maintenance comes to the front).

That is, I limit the connections pass-or-fail, because it matches the expected (sparse) use pattern and so also limits the ability of a compromised machine I might use as a source box from spanning into the target machine. For instance I can use a source host and then invalidate it by making a couple extra connections so if, say, I have to use an internet cafe (it's never happened, but it might) or hotel computer or whatever, I can keep a clever follower-on from using a key-logger or whatever, from just using the link agian. [granted he could use the information from a different computer etc and I have other means for dealing with that sort of thing (locking the access account after use until I can get somewhere secure and change the password; single-use passwords on some systems, etc), but in terms of a quick access and then block, this works well.]

Different access models require different tools. Being able to ssh in from just about anywhere has come up as useful. Having several useful ways of closing that door, or having it slammed shut perforce, after the valid use are also important levels in any paradigm.

Also, if you reuse the named recent table (e.g. "bad_actors" in this example) [or indeed a whole chain if it's not SSH specific if you replace "ACCEPT" with "RETURN"] in different rules you can easily catch a machine on its very first port-scan or on a single attempt to reach a service you know you don't offer (like SMB service) and drop it into the named table. This lets the co-variants of the one rule "gang up" on the bad actor from different parts of your rule set without invoking expensive external processes. For instance if you also --set an IP address as a bad_actor for sending you a SYN/FIN or a broadcast ping then that one host doesn't get to double or triple dip your security.

I would expect to be called on shortcomings... But that didn't happen... Someone who didn't bother to understand the code mis-applied it to his situation and then called that misapplication for being flawed.

See, I responded in a conversational chain about "brute forcing a key" with a basic structure on how to blacklist a brute force attempt source. (and in two other places I did paste the same code since Slashdot doesn't let you easily fold sub-topics, but in each case the conversation was slightly different.)

Now at no time did I say "this will solve all your problems or address all your issues". For example one of the "short-comings" was about logging and the other involved use _inside_ a VPN where connection rates would be intentionally much higher. Neither is a real short-coming as people with even trivial knowledge of program flow and iptables in general would know how to deal with both situations. Things like picking the network interfaces to apply the rules to, and fully understanding that where rules are not desired, they should not be applied. (it's kind of no-duh that way, life). [In fact, if you look at the command I use "ext+" (instead of the default "eth+" et al.) as the interface, which is completely non-standard to deter "cut and paste" application and encourage thought about how the model might be used.

Logging is another issue wholly. Most people collect _way_ more logs than they should and then end up losing their important information in a flood of data. [ASIDE: this is why Gestaltism failed and the Scientific Method came to prominence.] It _shouldn't_ take much brain at all to figure out the various ways that logging would dress onto the skeleton above. On systems with high logging standards I usually replace most-or-all "ACCEPT" rules with a jump to an accept chain that contains uniform "success" logging (e.g. see LOG target --log-prefix element). I like to put failure logging at "the point of failure detection", and only one fail notice, so that I don't have to fish through repeats. Then I let tools (like the way the "recent" match stores the date/time of encounters) do their jobs rather than spending a lot of CPU to re-chew raw logs for no flipping reason at all. [Mil-spec sites will, clearly, have other requirements, which are solved by other means.]

As for the Condescension. That too is a useful tool, applied quite carefully in this case, that makes people think and re-read instead of reflex flame. Now you have jumped valiantly to the defense of some clod, and I decry you for that, because you have amplified his mistake with your opprobrium. This makes you more wrong than him. You have stepped in as arbiter of form with disregard to content. You are pure noise with no signal whatsoever. your single data point is my *horror* repetition of the code in other contexts. You got me. I am willing to put the same idea in front of more than one subset of a conversation. How this must wound the internet, and confuse it beyond its ability to cope. The internet has never seen repetition so foul as I have done here.... oh wait....

I do indeed condescend, to him, and to you. His histrionic, left-handed, and unsupported assertion (q.v. "I would be fired if...") set the tone for what followed and I was willing in whole to treat with him on his terms. Your yappy-dog, I want to seem important too, infantile insertion was not even up to the low bar we were dancing above. Oh good show to you find tagger-along. You have wounded me to the quick with your amazing and subtle support of his shortsightedness. Bravo!

If you don't understand why littering a design pattern/example with noise is just plain bad instruction, perhaps you should retire from the field and take up something that better suits your cook-book-only, can't be bothered to think, self-limiting mentality.

yea, right... so what were those shortcommings again? that one guy didn't like the filter for his monitoring purposes... I fee so wrong for posting now... my shame is endless... whatever shall I do...

Oh yea... remember that if chump don't want the help, chump can ignore the help.

not if one adds logs to ones blocks, which is a different issue entirely.

Again "starting point".. contemplate it. Add "branching" and "core logical structure" and "basic computer programming" to the list of ideas you should work on and the do some reading up boy.

When you particluarly consider that I was addressing a "better way" to do the throttling (e.g. reducing from "4 attempts an hour" to "five attemtps in an hour causes indefinite block") all your plaintive whines are basically immature and off-topic blather.

Just admit that your "but what about (whatever)" statements reveal that you don't particularly know how to generalize yoru knowledge, the buckle down and do some study.

uh... I did... lets look at the command "iptables"... the word is right there... "table"... it's like the third through seventh letters... this is not that tough...

Perhaps the word "sub" confused you with sandwitch making issues?

See, the technique is to add a "--new -chain", which is correct to use synonymously as "table" given the history of the command (e.g. most people don't really try to get all "a chain isn't a table" particularly since I delinated a range in the table that happens to be in just the one chain therein so both words apply equally).

There is this mathematical discipline called "set theory" and a range within a table is itself a table, just as a subset is a set. So the range of the table that lies between the ACCEPT and the subsequent DROP is an ordered space where other directives can be added. If one wanted to log dropped connect attempts one could add "iptables --jump LOG" with no other conditionals or redundant tests right after the ACCEPT directive.

Perhaps you should learn to read before you get all corrective at people.

Maybe I am too old-school referring to a chain as a sub table, but that's where decades of experience tends to become a weight. Us old folks don't bother with distinctions that make no difference. I know that means the ball bounces a litte too fast for the self-obsessed to follow, but what is one to do in these circumstances.

Even more so, if one wanted to log _successful_ connections one could replace the word "ACCEPT" with the word "RETURN" and then place logs or whatnot after the --jump into ssh_throttle itself.

It's called "branching" and we use it in computer sicence all the time to remove things like redundant testing.

one size does not fit all. If you don't know how to ajust filters, or how to spot when a solution is not for you, just come out and say so.

You look foolish when you bleat that what someone offers doesn't work for your specific case and so decry it as unilaterally unsound.

Grow up.

The entire table is available for adding logging and whatnot. The (empty) range from the ACCEPT line to the final DROP in the sub table can also be decorated with logging or whatever else you might want to do with the failed packet, and then you only get one log entry per event instead of attempt. That logging or whatever was not germane to the example mechanic.

I do. Instead of parsing a long log I just "cat /proc/net/xt_recent/bad_actors" instead of parsing the hell out of a log file looking for nuggets.

The hard was isn't always the best way.

Why would the filter be on the NAT interface anyway?

If you don't know that every solution is not one-size-fits-all you deserve not to have that job.

If you cannot suss out the part where a generalized solution is a starting point for adaptation then you should never have managed to get the job in the first place. /doh.

I use the below. It has several benefits. It creates a blacklist of sorts of only the bad actors, which can be shared with other rule groups. It only does the test once instead of in separate rules for reject and log etc. I don't boter logging when I can check the bad actors table directly, but any fun things can happen after the ACCEPT (or RETURN) as long as you make sure you reach the pivotal --set operation.

Most importantly this lets 5 attempts per hour from any given IP address and if they have to go away for a day (obviously ajustable) before they can try again. This means you can get deep resistance (60 seconds is too short to truely deter some probes) but if you accidentlaly invalidate a host via over-use you just have to wait a day for things to be good again.

Good for use with ControlMaster option if you frequently have to connect to that host from a particular source. I also allow two password attempts only per connection.

Note that you can replace ACCEPT with RETURN if you want to run other tests after this before accepting the packet.

iptables --new-chain SSHTHROTTLE
iptables --append SSHTHROTTLE --match recent --name bad_actors --update --seconds 86400 --jump DROP
iptables --append SSHTHROTTLE --match hashlimit --hashlimit-name ssh_throttle --hashlimit-upto 5/hour --hashlimit-mode srcip --hashlimit-burst 2 --jump ACCEPT
iptables --append SSHTHROTTLE --match recent --name bad_actors --set --jump DROP
iptables --append INPUT --in-interface ext+ --proto tcp --match conntrack --ctstate NEW --dport 22 --syn --jump SSHTHROTTLE

iptables --new-chain SSHTHROTTLE
iptables --append SSHTHROTTLE --match recent --name bad_actors --update --seconds 86400 --jump DROP
iptables --append SSHTHROTTLE --match hashlimit --hashlimit-name ssh_throttle --hashlimit-upto 5/hour --hashlimit-mode srcip --hashlimit-burst 2 --jump ACCEPT
iptables --append SSHTHROTTLE --match recent --name bad_actors --set --jump DROP
iptables --append INPUT --in-interface ext+ --proto tcp --match conntrack --ctstate NEW --dport 22 --syn --jump SSHTHROTTLE