On fees: fees are generally charged, but they are tiny. However, all those involved in Bitcoin (including miners and software developers I spoke with) know that fees will rise and mechanisms are being created to make that simpler. The production of Bitcoins will halve in 2016, and miners are, over time, expected to derive the rewards that drive investment and operation of the system's functions (operating nodes, mining, "burying" transactions in the block chain, all interrelated) from fees rather than coins.
If you read Andreessen's piece and my essay, you'll see that he properly discusses essentially counterfeit payment from one party to another, but doesn't address fraudulent payment and the infrastructure to ensure that the party paying owns the funds used to pay. That is, if Bitcoins are stolen and used to pay for goods, a merchant faces the same trouble as if cash were stolen and used to pay. Except cash can be untraceable, and Bitcoin transactions can be tracked, even if the party isn't directly known who engaged in the transaction. Law enforcement could prove funds are stolen even if they can't recover the goods or services purchased with the funds, and clawback the funds from the seller/merchant.
None of that is addressed in Andreessen's essay, in which he proposes that Bitcoin by having very low or no fees on Bitcoin-to-Bitcoin transactions removes the necessity for any per-transaction fees as are charged to deal with fraud and overhead in a credit-card system.
Most merchants are going to be more likely to deal with an intermediary Bitcoin operator who will handle transactions on their behalf and charge a fee for chargebacks and theft recovery.
[Many people] without any without any formal medical training—can take advantage of access to global supply chains, cutting-edge medical knowledge, and recent leaps in design and fabrication technology that have made the prototyping process faster, cheaper, and simpler than ever before. Even as concerns about safety and liability are only starting to be addressed, medical inventors and other technical tinkerers are already improving and saving lives—sometimes their own.
Now, c'mon, grizzled veteran (like myself?).
The point of this article, which I wrote, is both to inform people of the practical aspects of 802.11ac, and also to deal with the disappointment. Average users, to whom these products are marketed in sound bites, may be upgrading because they think "faster is better!" This is to provide a realistic case for what 802.11ac will offer in Apple's version (and everyone's).
Outdated opinion on 5 GHz. The channels 149 and higher can broadcast at 20 times the signal strength of channels 36 to 48, and Apple and others have been boosting power progressively over the years. I can see it around me in my home and the last office I had: you can see a lot of 5 GHz now because of newer devices, where before, I only saw 2.4 GHz. That's anecdote, but fire up iStumbler or a Windows equivalent (aircrack-ng?) and see what I mean.
I'm never sure if Slashdot commenters read the original article or the blurb.
In the article, which I wrote, I explain the precise degree of risk, who is at risk, and how to mitigate.
* Recommending software: I did not write the article about 1Password Pro; Joe Kissell did.
* I do not receive a share of advertising revenue, nor is any my writing for any of many publications based on advertising revenue. I receive a fixed fee arranged in advance. Only the publication knows whether or not advertising was justified.
* Attacked on his income: Neither the publication TidBITS or me personally have any income issues associated with the sale of any security software.
This article was for normal folks, not security experts, and tried to explain in clear terms how to disable (for instance) any PIN-based access or switch away from a numbers-only passwords.
The criticism here seems both misplaced, conspiracy oriented, and not based on a reading of the article.
One way to make your old car run better is to look up the price of a new model.