Re:Simpler than that (Score 1)

It is not a principal-agent problem at all. It is a collective action problem. The entire group benefits if a sufficiently large subset contribute to the pot (reduce emissions). It is still in the best interest of all individuals to not contribute except for the single individual who moves the pot over 150 (reduce global emissions enough to avert disaster). The representatives are acting in the best interests of their constituents, thus it is not a principal-agent problem. This entire experiment is merely a slightly more complex version of the prisoner's dilemma. It stands more as a critique of experimental economics than as any critique of climate negotiations or game theory. At best, there are a few take-aways: 1. Telling people disaster is likely will probably result in higher emissions, as there is no reason to cut if disaster will occur. 2. Telling people exactly how much emissions need to fall AND how much everyone else is cutting can easily lead to more emissions than the case of uncertainty or ignorance. Both of these results are intuitively clear. They can be rigorously derived from simple tools that have existed for decades. It is unclear to me why it was necessary to 'test' these ideas with silly, small numbers on Columbia undergrads.