They are a barely alive gaming platform and they are starting remove features they were built upon...

On the other hand, requiring developers to offer "free to play" versions of their games makes the platform less attractive to them, and a console is nothing without developers.

Netflix wants "sufficient access to [ISP networks] without charge", but that doesn't have to mean peering. Netflix doesn't want ISPs neglecting indirect routes to content in order to push services like Netflix into connecting directly to their networks.

Nope. Go peddle your bullshit somewhere else. I ain't buying.

You and AT&T are employing what is known as a "straw man argument". Netflix doesn't want free peering arrangements. Stop intentionally misrepresenting their position.

But instead of buying more bandwidth, or purchasing from additional upstream providers, they yell about other people's networks not having enough andwidth.

Wrong. Netflix is "yelling" about being charged extra for bandwidth that Netflix's own provider has already negotiated with AT&T.

In a typical peering arrangement, both sides of the link pass roughly equal amounts of data to the other side. Netflix, however, gives Cogent so much data that the peering links are lop sided.

That's something for the peers to negotiate between themselves. AT&T can negotiate a better peering arrangement with Cogent, which would then be free to raise prices on Netflix. That's the way to do it without violating neutrality.

If net neutrality is forcing ISPs to accept peering arrangements with anyone, then take me off the list of supporters.

Net neutrality does not force ISPs to accept peering arrangements of any kind, nor is Netflix demanding ISPs be forced to do so. Netflix wants traffic that goes through an in-between ISP to be treated the same as all other such traffic. They don't want to pay a premium to not have their traffic artificially crippled by AT&T once it enters their network.

But, of course, you already knew that. Next time, try your weak arguments on a less educated crowd.

"Something must be wrong with this library (that is used successfully by everyone else)"

There's always a first person to report a bug, and some bugs are only apparent under specific circumstances. Always assume your code is to blame, but don't mistake that to mean that "nothing can be wrong with this library, because others have been using it successfully".

The submission suggests that the corporation is exploiting some security vulnerability, when really it is just using trust in a completely appropriate* way.

The problem is not that there doesn't exist a trust relationship between the client device and the proxy (there does), but that the original trust relationship between the client and the website is being violated by the the proxy's interception and modification of the website's SSL certificate. If a malicious third party somehow struck a deal with a trusted certificate authority and used it to monitor targeted communications (remember, trusted != trustworthy), we wouldn't call it anything other than a Man in the Middle attack.

"If you are on a company computer, prove they don't have a keylogger on it?"

Prove that your personal computer doesn't have one. Unless you've personally reviewed all the code and circuitry that could possibly be used for such a purpose, I shall not believe you.

"When the end cert is presented by an unknown party, it's a MITM."

It's a MITM when it's done by any party, known or unknown. If the data is being decrypted and captured as it flows between the endpoints of an HTTPS connection, the party doing so is a Man in the Middle.

"When it's done by the computer owner, under explicit ToS you agreed to, what's the complaint?"

Whatever the complaint, it involves the fact that "agree to" and "agree with" are different concepts.

"Trusted by the people who own the computer."

As opposed to those whose use it. Those whose information is being encrypted to supposedly protect against interception.

"and most proxys have ssl passthrough for banking and health..."

Except, of course, for websites not recognized by the proxy as containing "banking" or "health" information.

A trusted proxy is a "Man in the Middle", so I presume your objection is to the word "attack"? Whatever you choose to call it, the fact is that SSL certificates are transparently being rewritten in order to capture data each website's SSL certificate was meant to stop from being captured. "Trusted proxy" is just a friendly euphemism which attempts to justify what may or may not be a legitimate practice, depending on what's being collected and whether or not the users are, in fact, specifically aware of it.

Sadly, the law in most areas says no expectation of privacy in public places which includes at a bar.

Why "sadly"? You're out where anyone can see you. This includes artificial eyes like camera lenses and sensors. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine is a strength, not a fault.

"Yes and no. I am pretty sure the only reason BD/DVD/CDs can be transferred us because local law grants consumers that right."

It's the other way around: I can transfer BD/DVD/CDs because local law does not prevent me from doing so.

"The fact that physical media and manuals accompany the product is not sufficient to grant you the right to transfer the license UNLESS laws specifically grant you that right."

Again, it's the other way around: Attaching a license to a product does not in any way restrict my actions unless the law recognizes that license as valid and binding.