But another question one must ask is why there are so many applicants for this, when NESSIE (the European version of this challenge) managed just one? Has the mathematics become suddenly easier? Was this challenge better-promoted? (In which case, why did Slashdot only mention it on the day it closed?) Were the Europeans' criteria that much tougher to meet? If so, why did NIST loosen the requirements so much that they were overwhelmed?
These questions, and others, look doomed to not be seriously answered. However, we can take a stab at the criteria and evaluation problem. A strong cryptographic hash must have certain mathematical properties. For example, the distance between any two distinct inputs must be unconnected to the distance between the corresponding outputs. Otherwise, knowing the output for a known input and the output for an unknown input will tell you something about the unknown input, which you don't want. If you have a large enough number of inputs and plot the distance of inputs in relation to the distance in outputs, you should get a completely random scatter-plot. Also, if you take a large enough number of inputs at fixed intervals, the distance between the corresponding outputs should be a uniform distribution. Since you can't reasonably test 2^512 inputs, you can only apply statistical tests on a reasonable subset and see if the probability that you have the expected patterns is within your desired limits. These two tests can be done automatically. Any hash that exhibits a skew that could expose information can then be rejected equally automatically.
This is a trivial example. There will be other tests that can also be applied automatically that can weed out the more obviously flawed hashing algorithms. But this raises an important question. If you can filter out the more problematic entries automatically, why does NIST have a problem with the number of entries per-se? They might legitimately have a problem with the number of GOOD entries, but even then all they need to do is have multiple levels of acceptance and an additional round or two. eg: At the end of human analysis round 2, NIST might qualify all hashes that are successful at that level as "sensitive-grade" with respect to FIPS compliance, so that people can actually start using them, then have a round 3 which produces a pool of 3-4 hashes that are "classified-grade" and a final round to produce the "definitive SHA-3". By adding more rounds, it takes longer, but by producing lower-grade certifications, the extra time needed to perform a thorough cryptanalysis isn't going to impede those who actually use such functions.
(Yes, it means vendors will need to support more functions. Cry me a river. At the current scale of ICs, you can put one hell of a lot of hash functions onto one chip, and have one hell of a lot of instances of each. Software implementations are just as flexible, with many libraries supporting a huge range. Yes, validating will be more expensive, but it won't take any longer if the implementations are orthogonal, as they won't interact. If you can prove that, then one function or a hundred will take about the same time to validate to accepted standards. If the implementations are correctly designed and documented, then proving the design against the theory and then the implementation against the design should be relatively cheap. It's crappy programming styles that make validation expensive, and if you make crappy programming too expensive for commercial vendors, I can't see there being any problems for anyone other than cheap-minded PHBs - and they deserve to have problems.)
Found this interesting site, which is focussing on developing grid computing systems for gaming. The software they seem to be using is a mix of closed and open source.
This could be an important break for Linux, as most of the open source software being written is Linux compatible, and gaming has been the biggest problem area. The ability to play very high-end games - MMORGs, distributed simulators, wide-area FPS, and so on, could transform Linux in the gaming market from being seen as a throwback to the 1980s (as unfair as that is) to being considered world-class.
(Windows machines don't play nearly so nicely with grid computing, so it follows that it will take longer for Microsoft and Microsoft-allied vendors to catch up to the potential. That is time Linux enthusiasts can use to get a head-start and to set the pace.)
The question that interests me is - will they? Will Linux coders use this opportunity of big University research teams and big vendor interest to leapfrog the existing markets completely and go straight for the market after? Or will this be seen as not worth the time, the same way that a lot of potentially exciting projects have petered out (eg: Open Library, Berlin/Fresco, KGI, OpenMOSIX)?
I grow weary of the 2008 election political ads which adorn the pages of Slashdot nowadays. McCain seems to have a firm grasp on Slashdot's ad space, something which I'm sure is not purposeful on the part of the powers-that-be, but rather a well-targeted campaign from the McCain camp. This Jim Gerlach running for the PA 6th also has many ads, but the number of AZ senator's impressions simply dwarf that of Mr. Gerlach.
McCain's policies would do little more than hurt the average Slashdotter, so I question why the ancient senator would bother trying. Slashdot is decidedly libertarian in thought, even though its clientèle may vote Democrat or Republican most of the time. If my assessment is incorrect, then I would assume that Obama would have more of a chance of wooing Slashdotters--he's already gained support from the likes of Lawrence Lessig, Wil Wheaton, and Randall Munroe.
I would honestly like to see Bob Barr advertise on Slashdot, even if just to further spread the message of liberty and Constitutionalism.
For those unfamiliar with Delia Derbyshire, she was one of the top pioneers of electronic music in the 1950s and 1960s. One of her best-known pieces was the original theme tune to Doctor Who. According to Wikipedia, "much of the Doctor Who theme was constructed by recording the individual notes from electronic sources one by one onto magnetic tape, cutting the tape with a razor blade to get individual notes on little pieces of tape a few centimetres long and sticking all the pieces of tape back together one by one to make up the tune".
Included in the finds was a piece of dance music recorded in the mid 60s, examined by contemporary artists, revealed that it would be considered better-quality mainstream today. Another piece was incidental music for a production of Hamlet.
The majority of her music mixed wholly electronic sounds, from a sophisticated set of tone generators and modulators, and electronically-altered natural sounds, such as could be made from gourds, lampshades and voices.
"Experience has proved that some people indeed know everything." -- Russell Baker