In this case because China provides N.Korea's internet connection, and it would be a bad mistake to get them mad.

Not that I don't think the US govt. is abusive enough to do this on no evidence, but why not suspect Sony? They're also abusive enough, and have shown willingness to attack innocent parties without even pertended evidence. (Not that N.Korea is innocent of much, but I've heard of no convincing evidence that they are actually behind this.)

OTOH, it could be a third (unmentioned) group playing "Lets you and him fight.".

You're forgetting Georgia (U.S.) which was also a British penal colony.

Why should they bother to make it legal when they can just decline to prosecute the police? Which they already do.

Yes, even Finnegan's Wake had paragraphs. Of course one of them was, I think, three pages long. And a single sentence.

Not all corporate IT security is a joke. Some of it you don't hear news stories about.

Well, OK, but some of it actually is pretty good.

1) Yes, Anonymous is this stupid. It's an unorganized group of small groups of varying capabilities and talents. Some are only talented at mouthing off stupidly.

2) If Sony is pretending to be Anonymous, they are doing it anonymously, and therefore not doing it under false pretenses.

If this was a targeted attack, then forbidding outbound connections isn't sufficient. That keeps data from being transmitted out, but it doesn't keep malignent distorters from operating. Randomly changing a few bits every once in awhile could do quite a bit of damage, even invalidating backups, and be quite difficult to detect.

More to the point, in a case like this you need multiple nested perimeters. The media *is* the value of the company, so that should be stored on read only media, in multiple copies at different (secure) locations. Possibly encrypted, but then you need a somewhat similar protection for the keys.

Access to the media doesn't need to be available to anyone whose job doesn't involve editing it. So that another perimeter separate from that of the main company. If some management honcho says that he needs access, give him read only access. If he demands read/write access, have him work on a copy.

And, yes, this isn't perfect. Perfection is not available, so you nest near perfection. Now within each perimeter you also need those intrusion detection mechanisms you were talking about, but that doesn't suffice. Too much can happen too quickly.

It's not that simple. Your proposal is rather like people who want to choose which parts of the Federal Government their taxes fund. (Not that that's totally unreasonable, but implementation would be horrendous, and could be expected to increase the costs of most services.)

What do you mean "held accountable"? When was the last time a major political figure was prosecuted for his crimes, rather than becaus his opponents found prosecution a convenient stick? The last time I can think of is Nixon, and I'm not certain about that. (I don't consider sex with consenting women that you aren't married to to be a crime. So don't bring up Clinton. That was clearly political action rather than prosecution.)

He's saying that the phrasing of the headline reveals a bias in the submission. Perhaps he's right. (I don't watch either Dish or Fox, and I haven't followed their dispute, so this is based purely on his argument and your response...with some guidance from other posts both in this story and in past stories.)

It's a reasonable argument whether or not its true in this particular case.

The problem is that if you go back to when unions were relatively powerful, the ones who were powerful were the management of the unions. And they often didn't do well by their members. (Other times they did, but ran afoul of some law or other, some times a reasonable one.)

Centers of power tend to become corrupt, because corrupt people are attracted to them more strongly than those who are not corrupt.

I'd like to disagree. There are things that shouldn't be revealed under FOIA requests. Unfortunately the example of the federal government proves that we cannot trust redation to be applied in a reasonable manner.

I don't see a good answer.

That is pretty much how industry works. There is a right way to shut down a plant, and it involves a lot of things done in the right order. You can do an emergency shut down, and that will not kill anyone, but you will at minimum have to throw a lot of the stuff away that was going through the plant at the time.

Steel works are about a worst-case example of this. Lose power at the wrong time and you have no-longer-melted steel stuck in all the wrong places with no way to remove it. Removing this risk is impossible.