So you don't know if they're read it, yet you categorically state that someone is wrong in assuming they haven't read it since it's not stated that they have?

I didn't read your post, I just randomly clicked around on the screen and mashed on my keyboard with my fists and yet not only did I manage to quote your post, I formed a perfectly valid reductio ad absurdam by demonstrating how absurd it is to state that I haven't read your post while quoting it and replying to it's content.

I have no idea if it supports data: URIs but I've used HTMLDOC to turn html tables into PDF (since every PDF library I've ever used is absolutely shit at tables compared to HTML). It supports inline styles and <style type="text/css"> tags. It's not quite dead, but this year's update was the first since 2006.

I am sorely disappointed that clicking that link did not take me to a diatribe about how we are all educated stupid.

Just like honey, I assume.

News for trolls, pageviews that matter.

Feinstein is only against spying when it happens to her. You're on your own.

Since you're not sharing, I'm guessing you're imagining some sort of multiplexing scheme where the node would take say 100 bytes from 14 different sources and combine them into one packet and send that. It's an intriguing idea that would slow down metadata analysis but it would have a lot of overhead to keep track of, but that "keeping track of" becomes an attack vector again especially with subverted nodes, since node B will need to know that the next 8 packets from node A will have 100 bytes of data that need to be kept together and sent on to node C.

If the network is busy it should actually not be bad for interactive small-packet connections. If the network is idle there could be a timer before the node fills unfilled slots with random data and sends it.

And sure as hell it is impossible to develop a mixnet that will generate Camouflage traffic

It would have to generate traffic in equal amounts for every flow, which would halve network speed to give an attacker a 50/50 chance of guessing the correct flow. Those fake flows would also have to be carried to something that looks like a reasonable endpoint as well.

PRISM-level metadata collection makes it trivial to see which computer sent the original 682-byte request (recurse as necessary until the 800 byte request starts at the "sender") as well as which computer the multi-megabyte response was sent to (recurse as necessary until the multi megabyte response returns to the requesting computer). Camouflage traffic can't fix this on its own, it's easy to exclude the data that wasn't requested from the analysis.

I think that Tor's best bet while maintaining performance at this point would be to round all packets up to the nearest MTU (lets say 1400 to account for PPPoE, VPNs, and other layers on ethernet), so every request and response becomes a multiple of 1400 bytes, would make most tracking rely on packet timing. The next step would be to introduce packet delays at each hop, but that will slow the already slow network down.

It sounds like the ocular pressure test where they hit your eye with a puff of air. It definitely feels like getting poked.

what does this mean.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R...

The article, headline, story and comments are all bullshit.

Assuming the graph is not also bullshit, the correct story is that in the first 6 months of 2014 (1H 2014 on the graph), IE has had more vulnerabilities than all of 2013. IF this keeps up, then by the end of 2014, IE will have had more than a 100% increase in the number of vulnerabilities over last year.

When you want to build a bridge, you don't just throw a bunch of construction workers at it and trust them to make the best judgements, even though you might trust each one of them individually to build a sawhorse or something equally trivial.

You also don't have the president of the company come in and declare that this week we're switching to agile bridge building and fuck six, we're going to seven sigmas so we can be on the bleeding edge and shift our paradigms into high gear to synchronize our release schedule and get out ahead of the pack as we swing around the final stretch into the processification.

If it's not exactly the same then what we've got wouldn't be very useful.

I'm with the "destroy it" crowd. If someone attacks us with smallpox, nuke the fuck out of them.

But just no, to the conversation mirror - most parents already don't keep their eyes on the road, we don't need to give them another excuse.

Ah, memories of my childhood. Things like my father flying down the freeway at 60 turning around in his seat and screaming "You look at me when I'm talking to you boy!" while everyone else screamed about oncoming traffic.

At the time I learned to drive, I considered my greatest achievement was being able to hold a conversation without looking at the person I'm speaking with.