People are second-guessing and questioning whether there are exclusionary practices [and] everyday subtle acts of exclusion that collectively limit women's ability to succeed or even to compete for the best opportunities. And that's an incredibly positive impact.

Are people really that stupid? Huge payouts in these sorts of lawsuits isn't going to demonstrate to companies they should spend all their time policing their "everyday subtle acts". It's going to convince them women are legally dangerous and shouldn't be hired at all. It's a hell of a lot harder to bring a suit against a company that never hires you than against one for which you're employed, and business owners know this.

Let's be a bit more specific about that.

If they're restricting the length to something like 8 or 12 or 16 instead of 128 or 256 then they are PROBABLY not hashing the passwords.

Which means that your password is PROBABLY being stored in plain text (or possibly encrypted). NEITHER of which are acceptable methods today.

Seconded on the different email addresses. And you don't have to own your own domain for that. Just make some random'ish gmail account and use that ONCE for more secure requirements (like your bank).

The trick is to prepare them in advance. And write them down in a PHYSICALLY secure location.

If you're using the same email account for your bank as you use on Facebook then your security could be improved.

Well because the mass amount of data that would be grabbed in the event of an accident would far overshadow a reasonable amount of capture memory during normal driving, which would utilize a lesser set of sensors and maybe lower grade video, which didn't have to factor into the explanation for the accident.

256GB of flash is just over $100 right now. Storage is not a problem. Even AIRCRAFT do not have a problem with storage and they have a LOT more data to store.

Step 2 would include choices such as hit the breaks if it would work. I just used summary steps to make it easy to understand.

Taking power from the engine is NOT the same a braking.

Taking your foot off the gas is NOT the same as stepping on the brake.

Seriously. Try it on a hill. You might end up going FASTER at the bottom of the hill than at the top.

Your plates store information about your car, hence you know from looking the number up, everything to know about the car via reference lookup.

Make/model/year/VIN/owner/owner's address. And maybe whether it passed inspection or not.

How will knowing the VIN tell you anything about hitting it?

Or the owner's address?

Or the owner's name?

Or any of the other information?

And what happens when the site you're trying to use to look up that useless information is slow?

Unless the diceware lists are not known to the attackers, how is this any better than any collection of 6 bit numbers? And if you're counting on the attackers not knowing about this method, you've degenerated into security by obscurity. What am I missing? And why did some wanker delete essentially this same response from another thread?

Which of those steps covers engaging the braking system?

And how does the license plate "determine what would happen if you hit it"?

Why weren't the cameras and sensors on already if the car was operating autonomously?

If not, how will you avoid hitting him if he suddenly decides to sprint and jump infront of your car?

That would be "suicide".

And the sensor logs of the car should be able to show that it was suicide.

But more to the point, how would that situation be any different in a faster-reacting-autonomous-car than in a human-controlled-car?

Or are you postulating a world where there are no cars because someone might try to commit suicide by jumping in front of one?

Am I missing something here? How does this make the password/phrase any more secure than 5 (ect) 6 bit digits? It depends on the hackers not knowing about the diceware lists, which devolves simply into security by obscurity. Now if the list were different for each person who downloaded it, that would help SOMEWHAT, but this would still by no means be secure.

Somebody point out what I am missing, please.

That's not technically a T1 it is bonded DSL at 1536kbs. What makes DSL cheap is that it isn't going direct back to the CO but is shared. If it isn't shared, then why not bond it and deliver it as an actual T1. I'd assume they don't intend to meet the SLAs. Certainly though bonding up lots of inexpensive connections can make for a so-so to good but not great internet at terrific price point.

To prove them, I expect large fleets sponsored by the manufacturer or systems integrator will drive many thousands of hours per-car to establish a baseline, similarly to how an MTBF is established for devices, and that rate of collision or other liability-causing event will factor into the insurance companies' rates for those cars.

I think it will be even easier.

The autonomous cars will be packed with sensors that record EVERYTHING.

If there is an accident then the insurance companies will know which car has a 100% complete record of the incident that SHOULD exonerate it. Such as staying below the speed limit. Keeping a recommended distance from the car in front of it. Staying in the center of its lane. And exact information on how hard the brakes were applied and when and how that affected traction prior to the collision.

In theory, the insurance company for the autonomous car should win ever time (except in cases of software/hardware failure).

It's even easier than that.

Do YOU want to be the person dragged into court because YOU wrote the program that INTENTIONALLY HIT AND KILLED someone?

No? Then write the code to be 100% neutral. The code will ONLY attempt to stop the vehicle as fast as possible.

If pedestrians are within X meters of the car then the car should slow to Y. If they get closer then the car should stop.

But the code should NEVER have the option "hit object X".

I guess they don't teach English at this school either.

Make the attackers go through the school district's purchase order approval process to get their money. The computers will be restored in a few months with no payout.

The frustrating thing about this is that as soon as the method that the terrorists used to take over the planes in 9/11 was understood, the take-over-the-cockpit scenario became much harder, because now you have to defend yourself from all the passengers as well as the crew. There was no downside to adding the door security, but it was superfluous, and now we can see that it has a serious downside.

I think the problem here is thinking in terms of absolutes. What was needed to address the 9/11 scenario was a change to the balance of power, not a perfectly secure cockpit. Having a lockout that prevents crew from accessing the cockpit is too much security, because while it mitigates one risk, it creates another risk, and the second risk isn't particularly less likely than the first.