Not quite. As of November, the official CAs will claim that they've stopped issuing those types of certs. When something like the SSL Observatory points out that they're still issuing them, they'll say that this (and the other 8,192 times they did it) was a one-off mistake and they've updated their policies to make sure it never happens again. Then when they get caught again they'll say that it was test certificates that accidentally escaped. After that, they'll stop responding to reports. And we'll all be much, much safer, and phishing will be eradicated once and for all.

They'll offer to replace it, but only if you pay the shipping costs to send it back to Shenzhen.

It's not big brother, it's anyone. All of the IPMI systems used by Intel, Dell, HP, etc, are unaudited cesspits of remote-rootkit capabilities full of buffer overflows, authorisation bugs, parser errors, and so on. It's hard to know where to begin, but here's one starting point. Hack like it's 1999.

Intel SSD's have had AES encryption built in for years, it's no big deal. What they've added with their IPMI support is a capability for remote attackers to get at the encryption, which is kind of a big deal if you're worried about your privacy.

Microsoft have already done that. In Windows 8 they unified the Windows interface around the design for the vast number of Windows cellphones out there, leaving the totally insignificant Windows desktop/laptop market to wither. The overwhelming market response has justified this decision, in as little as twenty years Windows 8 could even overtake XP.

So you use it to drive an NPN transistor in common-emitter mode, say a 2N6338.

It's not money, it's access to goods (and pretty much everything else). If you wanted anything in East Germany (or Poland, Hungary, Romania, Russia, ...), you had to take shortcuts. My west German relatives used to visit their east German relatives with the car packed with luxury goods like tins of paint (for their roof), which were unavailable to most people in the east unless you knew how to game the system. All this study seems to be showing is that if you grow up in a society where you need to be able to game the system in order to get anywhere, you end up gaming the system in order to get somewhere.

I think this phone came from slightly further back on the horse. You probably wouldn't want to look in there too much.

It's important to note that in order to truly experience the noticeably superior audio from a Soundblaster ZxR you need to pair it with an appropriate Purity Audio Ultra GT preamp (retail $53,000), WAVAC SH-833 monoblocs ($350,000 each, you'll need two sets) driving Moon Audio Titan 2's ($510,000 each), with the equipment on an NTT Audiolab RC4 stand ($18,000) and Walker Audio speaker cables ($13,500 a pair, you'll need two pairs because you're bi-amping) alongside a PurePower 2000 power conditioner ($2,800).

Actual measurements of music reproduction quality rather than liberal use of the listener's imagination as in the HotHardware review have shown that even the crappiest DACs built into a cheap motherboard or laptop produce sound that's as good as anything from a professional sound system of 5-10 years ago. The important factor beyond that point is (a) noise immunity of the low-level signal portions (the inside of a computer isn't a good environment for those) and (b) the speakers. Whether you're using a Creative Labs or Intel Express chipset DAC doesn't make any difference.

Actually I think the use of algorithms to write articles is great, I'm currently working on an anti-article algorithm that extracts just the facts from algorithm-generated articles and turns them into tweets. So instead of having to plough through a long slew of pseudo-intelligent analysis, all you get are the essential sound bytes: "Cat explodes; canary charged by police", that sort of thing. Pretty soon it'll be bigger than Facebook.

TLS doesn't work that way, the implementation trusts, and uses, whatever keys it's told to trust (via certificates). And that's the problem, while most implementations will allow you to manage your own certs, for example by creating self-signed certs, the Windows implementation will only trust certs from commercial CAs. You know, Diginotar, Trustwave, Comodo, those sorts of guys. So you can't just generate and manage your own keys and certs but are forced to pay, and trust hundreds of external CAs to manage your certs (and by extension keys) for you.

Basically they want the people who write malware packers to tag the packed malware as malware so it can be easily identified. Sort of like asking burglars to wear a shirt with I AM A BURGLAR printed on it in large letters, and perhaps notify the police when they're planning to break into a house.

It's a cunning plan, but somehow I can't see it catching out many bad guys.

The problem was that Windows 7 gadgets had no security whatsoever, the only security setting you could have for them was "everything all the time" (there were theoretical config.options you could use that tightened things up a bit, but they weren't actually used). So you had the situation of ActiveX circa 1995 in a current OS that was touted as very secure (or at least "we tried really hard to make it very secure"). The issue wasn't why they discontinued it, it was how it ever got out the door in that state in the first place.