Comment Re:a few hours for one key would be good (Score 1) 236
Excuse me, you're putting words in my mouth. I talked about the value of your communications versus the cost of capturing and decoding them as the metric by which the NSA chooses to decrypt or not. I didn't put a restriction about you having to be a terrorist for it to be valuable enough -- I used an example of terrorism as an example of high value communication.
My apologies. I was using your example of high value communication and terrorism interchangeably; especially with regard to the NSA supporting other agencies. However, it does little to diminish the point that I was trying to make. It's only a matter of time until it's cheap and easy enough to look at anyone for any reason - the phone call that the NSA was waiting for to have them mine our data will soon become an email, then a batch request, then they'll be helping any federal or state agency to look at everyone automatically. Over time, that cost:value curve changes - and the cost of analyzing the data drops to the point where an extremely low value target is worth looking at extensively...or am I still misunderstanding your point?
It does seem like you have an understanding of systems security, and I do agree with what you say about weighing the value of what you're securing versus your adversaries interest, resources, etc. (Not exactly what you said, I know; but please excuse my loose paraphrase).