In the unlikely case you are not joking, I'll answer with a citation from Wikipedia:

So 8/3 of 5 imperial eggs is more convenient that 8/3 of 5 metric eggs?

I measure most things in half-armspans. However, that's not exactly weird because my arm span is almost exactly 2 meters.

It's not hard to write "km/h" behind the number on the road sign; that's actually standard in some countries. I'd guess there might still be some confusion, but that's mostly a matter of lacking common sense and/or the desparate try to find excuses ("Honestly, officer, I'd swear that road sign said 130 mph and not 130 km/h!").

Dude, you just crashed my irony detector.

Forcing an interface to have a forged IP is trivial, so the restrictions do not really inhibit concealing your IP address. With TCP you are basically limited to a SYN flood, however, because you will not be able to finish the 3-way-handshake with a forged sender address.

Sending an IP datagram with your own IP in the header makes you traceable? Inconceiveable!

Why do you have to write a ten page whitepaper for a simple observation that anybody who is able to find out his own IP address and click on two buttons on wireshark could make in about 5 seconds?

This kind of spending is nothing more that a giant stimulus package, but without any hope of secondary beneficial effects. You could simply take all that money and give it to the workers directly. That would be much cheaper,because you don't need to pay fo the materials (not to mention the revenue of the company owners).

Your argument bases upon the assumption that the attacker can not generate a malicious patch the same size as the original patch. That may or may not be true, depending on how the attack works. And in security questions, it's usually better to go with the more pessimistic assumption.

For extra security, use each of them twice!

So you have a situation where an attacker may substitute a patch with a malicious patch. That may or may not invalidate other hashes, depending on several circumstances of the attack, which are basically speculation. You can now either simply change the hash function, eliminating the problem, or ignore the problem and hope nothing will go wrong. Which option is better from a security standpoint?

DNS has allways been more or less centralized, and was allways controlled by the US. The US can already disable domains as they please, DNSSEC or not. The only difference with DNSSEC is, that it now impossible to change DNS data without having access to the keys. This makes DNS more secure for everyone, including private individuals.

Honest question: Why do people do that? I usually feel the noise pretty distracting, because some part of my brain always trys to listen. And listening without the visuals is usually not really satisfying. And if listening is not usefull, why keep the thing running?

Ecuador ranks a whooping 101 on the press freedom index, with an annually deteriorating index value. I'm not quite convinced it's the best country to exile to for people publishing inconveniant documents.

Whatever drug you are taking, take less. Or much more.

Also, I can't resist citing my favorite xkcd quote: "While the author's wildly swerving train of thought did at one point flirt with coherence, this brief encounter was more likely a chance event than a result of even rudimentary lucidity"