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Comment Re:Mandatory xkcd (Score 1) 229

Your justification is incoherent. If you want to administer "old school" Linux, you just use the old commands. If you want to administer a dist with systemd you use the new commands, or the old commands which are symlinked into their new equivalents.

I'm not sure what the fuck "old-school" even means since it has constantly changed from its inception. Except by saying "old-school" you demonstrate that Amish mentality - drawing a line in the sand and saying things shouldn't possibly progress beyond that point, even if its for the better.

All the whining over systemd could apply equally to procfs, devfs, pci, usb, btrfs, acls, etc. A barrage of changes that (competent) admins are expected to incorporate into their knowledge.

Comment Re:For me, there are two questions. (Score 4, Insightful) 229

The debate about micro or monolithic kernels was just a backdrop. The real reason HURD failed had more to do with the mindset of the people involved.

Linus (impatient with the pace of HURD) developed a quick and dirty kernel that a Unix user land could be built on top of. He took a lot of shortcuts, he didn't think too much about portability and basically just made a beeline for the end line - to get a shell and hence other stuff running over a kernel. The kernel filled out and became portable as the project gained momentum and volunteers.

Whereas HURD got stuck up its own ass for correctness and politics. And that's even before Linux existed as a thing. It's hardly a surprise that when Linux did appear that people jumped ship.

It's true there was a debate about micro kernel designs but that alone doesn't explain HURD's failure.

Comment Re:I want to try it (Score 1) 229

It'd be a lot easier if HURD attracted developers to work on it. The reason it is stuck in the mud is because looked up what pragmatism meant in a dictionary and decided it would be having none of that.

Comment Re:I'd Like To See Electronic Voting Work (Score 1) 105

From the wiki article you cite:
Broken Encryption

The encryption system used in the three ballot was broken by a correlation attack devised by Charlie Strauss[5] who also showed how it could be used to prove how you voted [6]. Strauss's attack relied on the fact that not all receipt strips can pair with all cast strip pairs since proposed triplets with 3 or 1 vote cast in any race on the ballot (not just one race of interest) can be rejected since the strips could not be from the same ballot. Since there are far more vote patterns on a typical United States precinct ballot than there are ballots cast in a precinct, statistically nearly all of the ballot pairs cast can only be paired uniquely with one receipt strip kept by the voter. This allows a the voters votes to be known by anyone with the receipt. Furthermore a voter conspiring to prove their vote (for money, coercion, or posterity) could mark all the strips in a unique previously agreed pattern that would assure recovery. Rivest et all, acknowledged this logic error in their concept[1], and revised the schema to require tearing off each race individually (destroying the correlation of the races) and having theoretically traceable tracking numbers on each race-level receipt. While this did restore the unbreakable aspect of the scheme, arguably the proliferation of receipts and chopped ballots rendered the mechanics of processing the votes or for a voter reviewing a receipt significantly complex, thus defeating its intended simplicity.

Comment now you have two problems. (Score 2) 105

If any electronic voting system is going to work, it would be a system that prints what you've voted so the voter can see what he/she voted. And then you have a separate electronic counting of those pieces of paper.

Now I know in the past they had some what similar systems in the US and they had problems with printers not working, so I don't know if they'll ever get it right.

There are also a whole lot of people who use terms like math/encryption or blockchain.

So far I haven't seen a system that works.

It does however make for interesting presentations:
http://media.ccc.de/browse/con...

Good lord, that did not make the problem better, you just have all the problems of both and none of the advantages.

And a photo of any such paper would allow you to prove how you voted which is antithetical to the secret ballot. Conversely a photo of a marked paper ballot is not proof of how you voted since it's not counted until it is invisible in the ballot box or optical scan. The voting machine makers tried to do something like that with a rolled continuous paper ballot printer the voter could see. However these tape ballots which were longer than a football field proved impossible to manipulate for recounting. With cut sheets it's easy to divide them into piles for any race and then have the observers help you recount the piles. takes very little time to sort and recount fixed page paper ballots for any given race being recounted. Not so with the toilet paper rolls. Furthermore, paper jams and printer malfunctions made these unreliable. paper ballots don't have that problem and if the opscan jams they can be counted later after putting them in a locked ballot box.

finally when a machine does go down or a church bus shows up to vote all at once, long lines ensue. When pen breaks on a paper ballot you get more pens, and you can have as many voting stations as you like.

Finally, which record is the actual record in case of a discrepancy? the electronic one or the paper one? ideally you want one tracable to the voters makrking action not her click-through glance at a printed paper ballot. With DRE's the errors happen during the clumsy touch screen process. (e.g. if you can't make a fist with one finger extended (people with R. Arthtrhitis can't) then you can't use a touch screen accurately. the touchscreens get out of calibration and programming errors result in incorrect recording of votes. pens on paper are generally more accessible (even though DREs can offer some handicap accessible features) and record the voters intent directly.

p>That way you have faster counting of votes and still everything on paper as back up.

faster? no slower. precint counting is not the slow part. the optical scans of paper count instantly. the rate limits are how may voters can vote at the same time (paper ballots win) and the protocols for collation to central tabulation of the precints (for which there's not any difference between opscan and a DRE voting machines).

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