A couple of things:
1. I thought your Google manifesto was very good (I know it's a work in progress).
2. I think you're reading WAY too much into certain things.
There is no grand conspiracy at play to "prevent people from running their own servers". There are many normal things on even client systems that can be described as a "server" such that the distinction is almost meaningless. Yes, there are plenty of traditional "server" and cloud services which many people use. The reason that Google has such language in the TOS isn't to do things like break the fundamental promise of the Internet or to enable government surveillance; it's because Google doesn't want people running businesses on 100 Mbps connections out of their homes. The promise of Google Fiber is predicated on the assumption that it's going to be consumer-type use; consumption, educational use, interaction with content, etc.
We all might be able to say that no one can predict what kinds of legitimate, high-bandwidth outbound services someone might be able to dream up from a home setting; Google is saying, "Don't set up the next slashdot or a cloud virtualization business from your house." The net neutrality argument is interesting, and I have to say I agree with the essence of everything you wrote on that subject.
Back to the other issues. I'm a little disappointed you called so many of my responses straw men; they're not in any respect.
I have not seen any serious calls for "backdoors" in secure protocols. You're completely misunderstanding what even the FBI wants: you're imagining a scenario where "the Man" has a secret backdoor to any running system, encryption, or secure protocol, anywhere. That is not only false, it actually would be gravely detrimental to our own security: we -- individuals, the civilian sector, the government, the military -- rely on the security of these protocols. It's similar to the belief among some that NSA has a "secret backdoor" in AES, even though AES is well-understood, and we use various levels of AES to protect everything up to the most sensitive classified information. If AES has a backdoor -- ANY backdoor -- it is useless to us.
What the FBI "wants" is the ability to lawfully wiretap communications that occur on the internet just as easily as it's been able to with, e.g., something like landline telephones. Telephone companies have implemented equipment and procedures which let law enforcement say, "We have a warrant, and we need to tap phone number XXX-XXX-XXXX in realtime," and the telecom operator needs to provide that capability in a timely fashion. Not a log of past activity, not days or weeks later -- realtime. This is a long-established practice.
The proposed CALEA modifications are intended to extend that capability to major internet communications providers. The Yahoos, the GMails, the Facebooks. So that instead of phone number XXX-XX-XXXX, a law enforcement entity has a clearly established procedure for obtaining a realtime "tap", as it were, on a person's private Twitter activity, Facebook activity, Yahoo email account, or similar. Again, this is using the same standards for probable cause and warrants which have been applied to communications for decades.
This doesn't mean "the FBI" wants a "backdoor" in ssh, ssl, or any other protocol. It's not even a "backdoor". If anything, it is a FRONT door: a formal set of procedures, and the systems and processes in place at internet and communications providers to handle it, which allows for the same kind of lawful "taps" on internet/digital communications.
So, what's "lawful"?
Why should law enforcement not have a capability to intercept communications with a warrant? Why is "the Internet" different? Because it's not just a thing, but also an idea which allows the free global exchange of ideas? Sure, but why does the body of law on our own society not apply to "the Internet"? Why should the FBI or any other law enforcement entity with a properly-obtained warrant not be able to have a mechanism to tap a person's communications in the same way they have been able to tap POTS phones? That's the crux of the issue. The fact is that the law already supports the interception of ANY communications with a warrant; the purpose of any enhancements to CALEA would be to make it actually happen in a useful and timely fashion.
Now, you can make it political if you must, but this is really mundane communications search and seizure activity, and as long as it happens within the letter and spirit of BOTH the Constitution and the law, there is absolutely no reason why digital communications are afforded any special status.
Now, YOU, as a person, may choose to use encryption. That is your choice. You may choose to use Tor, you may choose to use other methods to hide or obfuscate your communications. You may choose to communicate with anyone in the world. That's the beauty of this thing we've all built. But we still have our own social contract, our own body of laws, responsibilities which temper our rights.
You know, why don't you just email Vint Cerf and see what he thinks about the core of your net neutrality question wrt Google Fiber? He just might respond.