it would make both high-risk and low-risk drug development more profitable, and companies would still choose low-risk drug development.
Why would it make low-risk drug development more profitable? I'm assuming you mean the minor variants when you refer to low-risk drugs. Currently they get the full patent period for minor variants, since they are already authorized to sell them. This makes minor variants ridiculously more profitable than new drugs. Under my system, the minor variants get a much shorter patent period while the original drug gets a longer patent period. Well, a longer sales period.
Note: it's interesting that the original post describes the opposite problem (at least in wording). The article is about high-risk drugs being favored over low-risk drugs. This is because high-risk drugs succeed or fail quickly. Low-risk drugs take longer to test. Therefore the system is biased towards dangerous drugs. I'm guessing that you meant business risk rather than medical risk, as otherwise, your post makes no sense to me.
I'm also unclear as to why "socialized costs for prescription drugs" causes minor variants to be favored over new drugs. Yes, it causes new drugs (both variants and original drugs) to be less expensive to the user than they otherwise would be. It discourages doctors from making a trade off between cost and efficacy. But looking purely at the variant/original issue, I don't see how it matters. This is not to say that I don't agree with making prescription drugs bought by end users. I like that idea, although I suspect that it would be politically unpalatable.
Now if you want to raise a new issue of new drugs being encouraged in areas where there are already perfectly good old drugs, then that's a separate issue. My suggestion won't help with that, as it's completely orthogonal to that issue. It's not intended as a cure all. It's focused on two problems: the favoring of minor variants over original testing and the corporate disincentive to test fully.
It's possible that the FDA's standards are arbitrary and could be relaxed, but even if they are, it doesn't solve the problem. Currently, if a company finds a problem in testing, they are highly incented to avoid doing additional testing to explore the problem. Additional testing both increases their costs and reduces their revenue. Under my system, it would only increase their costs and potentially reduce their liability costs. Revenue would be unaffected (although delayed). This might even help with arbitrary FDA rules, as I expect some of them exist to cover over the disincentive for companies to extend testing.
The biggest oil platform, Hibernia, can only accomodate 185 people.
The fact that they encourage the wrong kind of innovation (minor variations on existing drugs) is not a problem with patents per se, it's a problem with the costs and risks of FDA approval: it's much safer to develop a small variant of an existing drug than to develop a completely novel drug for untreatable diseases.
Perhaps, but this is still addressable by changes in the patent system. In particular, they could change pharmaceutical patents to have three periods: testing, restricted use, open use. The testing period would last as long as necessary, perhaps longer than patent periods are currently. The restricted use period (primarily for antibiotics) would last as long as the approving agency desired. The open use period would last for a defined length of time (perhaps eight years). The effect would be to increase the open use period for new drugs and decrease it for retreads.
The current system makes it difficult for a pharmaceutical company to extend the testing phase. Each additional year in testing is a year lost from being able to actually sell the drug. This produces bad results, as companies are terrified of extending the testing period. If the patent period were shorter but only started *after* testing was finished, this perverse incentive could be removed.
Because despite recent bad press, they are interested in security.
Your post makes various other points that sound reasonable to me, but I have to call out the above line from a couple of angles:
1) using the phrase "bad press" implies a virtuous subject that has been distorted by a reporting industry with a non-virtuous agenda. NOTHING OF THE SORT has happened to poor lil' NSA here... they FUCKED us, straight up, and got caught red-handed.
2) Whatever the extent to which the NSA is "interested in security", it might as well be the extent to which a wolf is interested in "keeping chickens alive"... yes the wolf wants a food supply, but that doesn't make the wolf a proponent of livestock. The NSA is all about surveillance at this point; their putting on the badge of promoting security is a means to an end. I won't rehash the extensive list of public standards they secretly compromised to that end; it speaks for itself.
Again, I think much of what you wrote makes sense, but in this particular line you stray notably too far into something approaching neutrality about the NSA. They are bad people with a bad agenda, and they'll fuck YOU the first chance they get.
Does the semi-autonomous (or future, 100% autonomous) car pull over?
are the laughing people getting paid?
It's a simile
2.4 statute miles of surgical tubing at Yale U. = 1 I.V.League