That's right, because they're working for US gov, not for Chinese gov.
Ah, that explains chillingeffects.org, their switch to RC4, SSL by default, and their strong support of the EFF, right?
For chillingeffects.org read the rest of my last post.
RC4, and SSL are irrelevant because the gov gets the data unencrypted. Encryption just makes your data unavailable to anyone other than the government, because the government hates competition.
EFF - publicity, "don't be evil", and the same old self-serving goals.
For instance, unlike Yahoo and MS, Google famously has repeatedly refused to work with the Chinese government when they request details on dissidents.
That's right, because they're working for US gov, not for Chinese gov.
Who besides google works closely with the EFF, particularly with the ChillingEffects site?
Google is against software patents, and are known to invest a lot in lobbying against them. Unlike the pharmaceutical and financial companies that are on the other side of the fence. ChillingEffects (as awesome as that resource may be) _from Google's perspective_ can be considered an astroturfing campaign.
Who besides google has shown the guts to say "get a warrant" to unofficial government requests?
Knowing that such requests are followed by FISA orders that you mention later in your post, the only purpose this "get a warrant" message serves is publicity and nothing else.
No cracks in commonly used encryption, just a lot of computing power to brute force it. I remember 10 years ago there was speculation that for a few billion dollars you could build a machine capable of cracking common codes in a few months, and that the some countries probably had them already.
You don't crack commonly known encryption, you just design flaws right into it at the standard level:
Cryptographers have long suspected that the agency planted vulnerabilities in a standard adopted in 2006 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the United States’ encryption standards body, and later by the International Organization for Standardization, which has 163 countries as members.
Classified N.S.A. memos appear to confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by the agency. The N.S.A. wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international group, privately calling the effort “a challenge in finesse.”
“Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor,” the memo says
Your weak link here is I don't want to tell some megacorp more about me.
Than you'll have to deal with more clutter on your screen - like those "mark as important" tags set at random.
Software production is assumed to be a line function, but it is run like a staff function. -- Paul Licker