Why would that matter ? The attacker still knows the state of the hash just prior to inserting the SEED, so what do we gain from this ?
You're right. I hadn't thought of it that way. I suppose that the only real solution to this would be to double the message, such that every part of the message has a chance to affect the resultant state after every other part of the message has been hashed, ie:
hash(n+SEED+n+SEED) or hash((n+SEED)*2) depending on your personal preferences for pseudocode.
I will now assume that a truly secure hash algorithm does this automatically and move on.
How about using hash(n + previous_hash) ?-)
hash(n+previous_hash) is also totally unacceptable. Each new hash value has a 1/(2^hashlength) chance of colliding with another sequence created using an arbitrarily chosen SEED. Again, I invoke the birthday paradox. After 2^(1/2*hashlength)==sqrt(2^hashlength) new numbers there will be a 50% probability of the two sequences colliding and being the same sequence thereafter.
I suppose you probably already understood this to some degree, as you put a "?-)" after your question, but I decided to answer seriously anyway.
By the way, IANACE (I am not a cryptology expert), but I have read some books on it and taken a course at CTY, and have also done some of my own research online and theoretically (ie, thought experiments having to do with ideal systems AND practical systems).