Some mixture of pragmatism and the victim blaming, I imagine.
Given that, operationally speaking, the NSA and GHCQ, and friends, are above the law(where it hasn't been modified to simply make what they do legal, because it's them doing it); your only real option is to start assessing providers of security-critical products and services according to the "Were a dangerously out-of-control clandestine entity to come knocking, would you be fucked or really fucked?" standard.
It is obviously Bad that you need to ask that question; but, since you do, you at least want the answer to be reassuring. Given that, according to what we know so far, the production process for SIMs involved Gemalto burning (insecurely transmitted) Kis in, at the factory, it looks like the production process is dangerously weak against tampering. As with the RSA seed storage/hack fiasco, it looks like that is going to have to change, with the vital secrets either stored a lot more carefully, or, ideally, generated on-SIM and never leaving the SIM during its operational life, short of a direct silicon-level attack.